HUMANITY AT RISK

Global Terror Threat Indicant



Strategic Foresight Group

CRIC THE CENTRE FOR THE RESOLUTION OF INTRACTABLE CONFLICT

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

Strategic Foresight Group

CRIC THE CENTRE FOR THE RESOLUTION OF INTRACTABLE CONFLICT

C-306, Montana, Lokhandwala Complex, Andheri West
Mumbai 400053, India
Email: info@strategicforesight.com

Concept and Direction: Sundeep Waslekar, Ilmas Futehally
Research Team: Anumita Raj, Diana Philip, Janaina Tewaney-Lala, Jayantika Kutty, Yash Kadam
Creative Head: Preeti Rathi Motwani

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PREFACE

Strategic Foresight Group (SFG) was established in January 2002. It was a few months after Al Qaida had attacked important political and economic targets in the United States. The US had then launched a War on Terror. In the United Nations, world media, capital cities, as well as small towns, terrorism became a significant issue. It wasn't the first time that terror attacks of such lethality had taken place. But somehow, the rise of Al Qaida and the War on Terror characterised a new phase in world history.

Al Qaida had formed an international Islamic front, terrorism and counter-terrorism got enmeshed with the issues of trust and lack of it between the Western and Islamic countries. As a matter of fact, in the early years of this century, there were terror groups in Sri Lanka, Nepal, Uganda, Colombia, the Philippines, India, which had nothing to do with what is now known as the jihadi ideology. Nevertheless, terrorism in the name of jihad, as interpreted by some groups was on the frontier of global discourse.

It was obvious for an institution born in such an environment to address the issue of terrorism. SFG made efforts to narrow the deficit of trust between Western and Islamic countries and persuade political leaders from all sides to work together to deconstruct and not merely counter, terrorism. The process involved three round-tables in partnership with the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) in the European Parliament and the League of Arab States, bilateral consultations with leaders of governments and other political institutions and conceptual work to underpin the dialogue processes. These activities were a priority for SFG from 2003 to 2007. They concluded with a report, An Inclusive World: In Which the West, Islam and the Rest have a Stake.

In the decade since 2007, it was hoped that the threat to humanity that terrorism posed would subside. Indeed, many terrorist groups earlier acting in the name of ethnicity, Marxism, sub-nationalism, either disappeared with the force of the state or negotiated successful compromise agreements. However, terrorist groups acting in the name of jihadi ideology have flourished and some nationalist groups have also allowed jihadi ideology to subsume their original cause. In the last two years, ISIS, also known as Daesh or ISIL, dominated international media with its brutal methods.

With the growth of terrorism, in the last decade, we have been caught in a downward spiral of a world-wide conflict. As Lord Alderdice points out in his Foreword, the critical problem in dealing with this new phenomenon is that we do not understand it. There is also a belief that this conflict and the jihadi ideology which underpins it, is autonomous. In reality, states or interest groups closely aligned with powerful states are actively involved in sponsoring terrorism.

Several countries ranging from India and Afghanistan to Syria and Yemen, as well as Congo and Libya suffer from terrorism supported by interest groups closely aligned with states in their neighbourhood. Nevertheless, there is a general apathy to discuss the role of states in understanding terrorism, as much as there is ignorance of the psychological factors which make a terrorist forget the lines between past and present and near and far.

With the deteriorating situation of the last decade, apparent gaps in our efforts to deal with terrorism and the failure of conventional methods, there has been a call on several think-tanks and research institutes to undertake neutral and courageous analysis of the phenomena of terror. SFG and the Centre for the Resolution of Intractable Conflicts (CRIC) at Oxford University have been making efforts to address the conceptual issues.

Two years ago, SFG revived its work on Deconstructing Terror with a panel of Western and Islamic thought leaders at the Alliance of Civilisations Meeting in Baku. Last September, at the Annual CRIC Conference, there was a dedicated session on how terrorism is perceived in different parts of the world. In February this year, some of the world's leading thinkers on Deconstructing Terror came together in a round-table in Pune, India.

These discussions, supported by scholarly research have led to an important conclusion. It is that terrorism is driven by break-down of complexity which is further driven by a combination of developmental deficit, democracy deficit and dignity deficit. Further, terrorism creates a multiplier impact that is much greater than the visible impact and poses risks to humanity. The inclination of some terrorist groups to acquire material used in the making of nuclear weapons indicates the magnitude of the potential risk.

This report attempts to diagnose and understand the phenomenon of terrorism with hard facts and figures. It is the result of cooperation between CRIC and SFG and several intellectuals who have supported our efforts with their insights. I hope that the report will make a useful contribution to the debate.

Sundeep Waslekar
President
Strategic Foresight Group

August 2018

FOREWORD

More than a decade ago, Strategic Foresight Group worked on and published a great deal on the problems of Constructing Peace, Deconstructing Terror and building An Inclusive World. At that time there were many groups from various different backgrounds using physical force and the tactics of terrorism to bring about political change. Since then terrorism has continued to rise up the political agenda, but the focus seems to have narrowed down to those driven by jihadi ideology, and despite the expenditure of enormous resources and a multitude of global efforts to counter violent extremism, the world has become a less stable, predictable and peaceful place.

If we are to have any hope of pulling back from what seems to be a downward spiral into global conflict, on land and sea, and in the air, in space and in cyber-space, we must apply our minds to understanding better what is driving this phenomenon and how to undermine it.

This report contributes to the next stage of this process with an evidence-based approach to investigating who these groups are, and where they come from, as well as sketching out some initial understandings about why some are transient, while others are resilient and can sustain their activities and their ideology over decades, or even generations.

Though the fundamentals of the ideology may not change much, the tactics and the strategies do evolve and while some Islamist extremists may in the past have wished to 'change the system', others now want to 'burn the system' and are prepared to inflict terrible pain and misery in the attempt. Since World War II the capacity to wreak global havoc and destruction has been available to the major powers, but as this monograph points out, our concern must be that such capacities could become available to terror groups with an apocalyptic narrative.

This is not a volume that will reassure you, but it may well energize you to do what you can to recognize why there is an unprecedented urgency about deepening our understanding, even if it unearths some uncomfortable truths, and to strengthen our capacities to address the profound risks faced by man's inhumanity to man in our day.

Professor, the Lord Alderdice FRCPsych
Director
The Centre for the Resolution of Intractable Conflict (CRIC)
Oxford University

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Future Imperfect

This report presents an analytical framework and tools to enable policy makers to look into the future. It does not predict the future, since thinkers including Lao Tzu, Nils Bohr and Mark Twain have warned about the futility of prediction. Rather it provides tools which can help us think about various alternative trajectories for the journey of humanity in the next decade, 2020 to 2030, and the risks that we should be wary about.

Humanity, of course, faces many risks other than terrorism. Those related to climate change and the depletion of water resources will become more and more pronounced in the period beyond 2030. The rise of competitive extremism of all shades, misuse of weapons of mass destruction and economic disruptions can undermine human progress or even survival in the period from now until 2030. They are all interlinked with terrorism, as this report reveals.

In order to assess our imperfect future, this report has constructed the Global Terror Threat Indicant. It is a tool to help us anticipate the source of worldwide threats to global security. It is based on the analysis of the combative strength and penchant for nuclear material of the terrorist groups proscribed by the United Nations and in addition by at least four individual countries or regional organisations. It doesn't take into account the individual concerns of countries if the specific groups they are concerned about are not in the UN Sanctions List. Thus, the focus is on the world at large.

The Global Terror Threat Indicant is required because security planners are generally inclined to focus on the limited space where their individual country faces threat, ignoring the global picture. The Europeans are worried about terrorism emanating from Europe or North Africa. The Indians are worried about South Asia. The Americans are worried about their borders. It is like dealing with each symptom of a disease separately. It doesn't help and it cannot work with regards to terrorism either. Disease which is global has no local remedy.

The report also presents three Scenarios addressing the linkages of the global terror threat with geo-political developments, diplomacy, security management, socio-economic factors and political processes. All three Scenarios or some amalgamation of elements within them are possible. It would be unwise to predict that a particular Scenario will materialise. The governments around the world have to be prepared for all possibilities and use the Global Terror Threat Indicant to have such a sophisticated unity of purpose and coordination that the least damaging Scenario is realised. If they fail to do so, either the terrorists or the masses will take over and undermine the hypothesis of the survival of the present international system. Lao Tzu said: "Those who have knowledge don't predict." We don't have any knowledge of the shape of things to come. But we will still dare not predict. We can only hope that the Indicant and the Scenarios will provide fresh perspectives to address the challenges of our imperfect future.

Part 1: Who

Backgrounder

In order to address the problem of terrorism, it is essential to understand the main actors and their enablers. Strategic Foresight Group had analysed almost 200 groups actively involved in committing acts of terror in the first half decade of the twenty first century. During that period, the groups motivated by their own interpretation of Jihadi ideology accounted for only a fourth of almost 200 groups around the world. Other groups were driven by Maoist ideology, sub-nationalist and ethnic grievances and other specific issues of concern.

In the last ten to fifteen years, many of the groups other than those driven by Jihadi ideology have been either absorbed in mainstream politics or been eliminated. The Irish Republican Army in UK was the first significant group to seek a political solution at the turn of the century, just as Al-Qaida was preparing to unleash a new era of terrorism with its dramatic attacks on strategic targets in the United States. Since then, FARC in Colombia and Maoists in Nepal have found political solutions. LTTE in Sri Lanka has been eliminated. New People's Army in the Philippines, National Alliance and Aryan Nations in the United States, and Lord's Resistance Army in Eastern Africa have been weakened. There are still terror groups active at the local level, such as the Naxalites in the central districts of India, ELN in Colombia, groups in the Niger delta in Africa and a few others. But there is no doubt that the terrorism map of the world has changed in the decade from 2007 to 2017.

The new terrorism map is dominated by groups inspired by Jihadi ideology. Even some of the groups earlier identified with sub-nationalist and ethnic agendas are now increasingly merging with the Jihadi stream of thinking. There is also rise of the right-wing extremism in some parts of the world, with potential risk of some translating it into terrorism. However, so far, right-wing and ultra nationalist extremism had demonstrated the tendency to dominate the democratic political space rather than resorting to acts of terror. Thus, with the absorption of the sub-nationalist agenda by Jihadi ideology and the preference of ultra nationalist groups to capture the mainstream political space, the Jihadi groups have emerged as the dominant actors on the terrorism map of the world.

Among these groups, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh has attracted much of media space in the last five years. But with swift rise and fall of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh, the Al-Qaida remains the most resilient network. Until 2011, it was led by Osama bin Laden. Now his son, Hamza bin Osama bin Laden has emerged as what sections of the media describe as the "new crown prince of terror". He is attempting to unify the fragmented Al-Qaida factions. There are indications that Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh combatants may not return to their home lands, including Europe, and may join other groups. A newly resurgent Al-Qaida under Hamza bin Laden's leadership may provide them a base. In any case, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh itself had emerged from Al-Qaida due to personal and tactical conflicts between two leaders. It would be only natural if these two and other groups unify again in an integrated network, though the degree of integration will depend on several factors.

The most significant factor influencing the future of Jihadi groups would be the support they get from states, intelligence agencies and criminal networks. The birth of Al-Qaida was in Pakistan and then Pakistan influenced Afghanistan. Osama Bin Laden had a safe haven in a huge compound near the Pakistani military establishment in Abbottabad. The compound was much larger than the surrounding houses of retired Pakistani military officers. The occupants of the compound often bought expensive goods from a neighbourhood shop that most people in the vicinity could not afford. The presence of an important family in the compound was nothing but conspicuous.

Since taking its birth in the Pakistan-Afghanistan region, Al-Qaida, its splinter groups, and particularly Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh spread to the Middle East, Africa and Southeast Asia. The acts of terror in Iraq and Syria remain in the eye of storm because of their intensity, frequency and brutality in the context of a geopolitical rivalry between regional and global powers. The movement of combatants from North Africa and Europe to Syria has placed a spotlight on the Levant region in the terrorism map of the world. On the other hand, movement in reverse direction of refugees and extremists to countries surrounding Syria and Iraq, particularly to Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey and then onwards to Europe has turned the greater Middle East into the most significant cause of concern for European policy makers.

The phenomenon of lone wolf attacks, miniaturisation of the weapons of terror, and the phenomenon of turbo terrorism where young people enjoying material life seem to have almost overnight been inspired by Jihadi terrorism, have together combined to focus the attention of counter terrorism efforts on local factors.

The excessive focus on immediate issues is natural but it only results in dealing with symptoms rather than the malady. There is a need to shift the mindset from “countering” terrorism to “deconstructing” terrorism. This would require understanding the psychology of terrorism in depth as well as understanding the politics of support to terrorism. In the next part of the report on “why and how”, we try to examine the psychology of terror. In this part on “who”, we focus on who enables terror.

Terrorism has become a sustaining phenomenon because of the sustaining support it is able to secure from some societies and states. Even lone wolf attackers need ideological nourishing which is provided on a systemic basis. In the age of turbo terrorism when young people turn to terror in an extremely short span of time, it is essential to address immediate, as well as fundamental factors nurturing terrorism. It is therefore necessary to develop a Global Terror Threat Indicant which can give us an insight into one of the critical threats to humanity.

1. Defining Terrorism

2004 **UN Security Council Resolution 1566.**

"Criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature, and calls upon all States to prevent such acts and, if not prevented, to ensure that such acts are punished by penalties consistent with their grave nature;"

2004 **The report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change also makes a reference to the definition of terrorism given under Security Council resolution 1566 (2004).**

2004 **The report was acknowledged by the UN General Assembly.**

Note: There is no global consensus on a common definition of Terrorism. For the purposes of this report, the UNSC Resolution 1566 (2004) is used.

2. United Nations Instruments

Aviation Security

1963	Inflight safety (acts of terror committed on-board)
1970	Hijacking
1971	Inflight safety (violence against persons, endangering security of aircraft)
1988	Terrorist acts at airports
2010	Recognition of different forms of hijacking (modern technology)
2010	Use of civil aircraft as a weapon
2014	Expands jurisdiction of states over offences committed on-board

Maritime Security

1988	Prohibition of terror acts affecting international maritime navigation
1988	Acts against fixed platforms on the continental shelf
2005	Criminalises the use of ships as a means and a weapon of terror
2005	Strengthening the legal regime on fixed platforms

Nuclear Security

1979	Physical protection of nuclear material
2005	Mandatory for countries to protect and cooperate with each other to protect nuclear material
2005	Suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism



Protected Persons and Hostages

1973 Taking diplomatic agents as hostages a punishable offence

1979 Taking of hostages

Explosives and Bombings

1991 Control and limit the use of unmarked and undetectable plastic explosives

1997 Suppression of terrorist bombings

Finance

1991 Suppression of the financing of terrorism

Note: There is no comprehensive global instrument on terrorism. In 1996, a draft Comprehensive Convention on Terrorism was proposed. As of 2017, it still remains a draft.

3. Proscription

Proscription is a part of the United Nations Security Council's counter-terrorism programme. It is referred to as 'targeted sanctions' which can be against individuals and entities. The counter-terrorism sanctions regime created under Chapter VII of the United Nations (UN) Charter obliges UN member states to, amongst other things, impose an asset freeze, travel ban and arms embargo on persons and entities designated by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and also to take all necessary domestic measures to criminalise support of terrorism.

The objective of proscription is to restrict elements that would contribute to a thriving environment for a terror group. It is to ensure that a group or an individual is unable to garner any support for itself including through raising funds to carry out acts of terror.

The UNSC generates a 'Consolidated Sanctions List' which has the names of all individuals and entities that come under the UN sanctions regime. This list therefore is of operative value to the member nations. The UNSC has two notable sanctions regimes against three global terror groups namely Afghan Taliban, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh and Al-Qaida. The consolidated list consists of all individuals and groups associated/linked with these groups as well as others that have been designated so by the UNSC, if they pose a threat to international peace and security. According to the UN, the inclusion of all names on one Consolidated Sanctions List is to facilitate the implementation of specific counter measures by member states. The names on the list therefore are generated from multiple sanctions regimes and the criteria for listing these names also differ.

In addition, it must be noted that in the aftermath of the attacks of 11th September 2001, UNSC Resolution 1373 was passed and it encourages member states to create their own version of sanctions list (also proscription/black/banned list etc.) of individuals and entities as a part of their counter-terrorism efforts. In practice, countries implement these sanctions as they see fit. As a result, most countries as well as certain regional bodies in the world have adopted a black listing or a proscription process.

For the purposes of this report, the 'Consolidated United Nations Security Council Sanctions List' was used to generate a list of terror groups that pose a threat to global peace and security. This is because the list is comprehensive and is generated by the UN which is a legitimate international body and has the backing of all the nations in the world. This ensures that the listing as well as delisting of an individual or entity is highly scrutinised, politically driven and not an easy process. On account of difficulties in delisting groups, practioners believe that the listing creates difficulties in negotiations with such groups. However, for analytical purposes the UN Sanctions List does not have a better option.

In addition to the entities and other groups in the UN Consolidated Sanctions list, Afghan Taliban and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh (which as mentioned previously have been separately proscribed by the UN), have also been added to the list used in this project. It is to be noted that while Al-Qaida has been separately proscribed, it is also mentioned in the Consolidated Sanctions

List. Groups or entities often change names in order to avoid the consequences of being on the UN Consolidated Sanctions List. Hence, the project also focuses on whether the groups are 'active' in its given form with its varied names.

Note: There are several groups including Hamas, Hezbollah, Muslim Brotherhood, Indian Mujahedeen and Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) that have been proscribed by several countries and entities. However, as they are not proscribed by the UN and do not feature at present in the Consolidated Sanctions List, they have not been taken into consideration.

4. UN Sanctions

This list has been prepared from the UN Consolidated Sanctions List of 4th October 2017. The names of individuals, financial entities, business enterprises, companies, charitable organizations, media and publishing bodies and educational institutions that are in the UN Consolidated Sanctions List have been excluded.

Active or Not Active:

Time frame: From January 2015 to April 2018, the date of completion of research for this report

Criteria for designating a terror group as "Active", "Not Active":

"Active": At least one of the following criteria is fulfilled-

- There is publicly available information on activities of the group (training camps, control of territory etc.) in the given time frame
- The group has carried out at least one attack in the given time frame
- Any statement issued by the group through its publications or on social media in the given time frame
- Any new publication released or social media updates by the group in the given time frame
- A defence force or government agenda has been discussed or set up to target a specific group in the given time frame
- Groups which have affiliation to or are linked with another terror group, and continue to function under their own name in the given time frame.

"Not active": At least one of the following criteria is fulfilled-

- Group has announced its dissolution
- Group has splintered and the original entity has ceased to exist as a result
- There is no publicly available information on activities of the group in the given time frame
- Groups which have affiliation to or are linked with another terror group, and do not continue to function under their own name (or has renounced its name).

5. Status of Terror Groups

Active Not Active

- Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB)
- Abu Sayyaf Group
- Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)
- Afghan Taliban
- Al Mouakaoune Biddam
- Al Moulathamoun
- Al Mourabitoun*
- Al-Itihaad Al-Islamiya (AIAI)
- Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant
- Al-Qaida
- Al-Qaida in Iraq
- Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
- Al-Shabaab
- Ansar al-Charia Benghazi
- Ansar al-Charia Derna
- Ansar al-Islam
- Ansar al-Shari'a in Tunisia (AAS-T)
- Ansar Eddine*
- Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan
- Armed Islamic Group
- Asbat al-Ansar
- Djamat Houmat Daawa Salafia (DHDS)
- Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM)
- Egyptian Islamic Jihad
- Emarat Kavkaz**
- Forces Democratiques De Liberation Du Rwanda (FDLR)
- Haqqani Network (HQN)
- Harakat Sham al-Islam
- Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HuM)
- Harakat-ul Jihad Islami
- Islamic Army of Aden

- Islamic International Brigade (IIB)
- Islamic Jihad Group
- Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
- Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant(ISIL)/Daesh
- Jaish-i-Mohammed
- Jam'yah Ta'awun Al-Islamia
- Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad (Boko Haram)
- Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA)
- Jemaah Islamiyah
- Jemmah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT)
- Jund Al-Khilafah In Algeria (JAK-A)
- Jaysh Khalid Ibn Al Waleed
- Jund Al Aqsa
- Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LJ)
- Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT)
- Libyan Islamic Fighting Group
- Lord's Resistance Army
- M23
- Makhtab Al-Khidamat
- Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group
- Muhammad Jamal Network (MJN)
- Mujahidin Indonesian Timur (MIT)
- Mouvement Pour l'Unification Et Le Jihad En Afrique De l'Ouest (MUJAO)
- Rajah Solaiman Movement
- Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs (RSRSBCM)
- Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR)
- Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
- The Army of Emigrants and Supporters
- The Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)*
- Tunisian Combatant Group

Note: *Active: Al Mourabitoun, Ansar Eddine, The Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb(AQIM) together formed a new group in March, 2017 called JNIM {(Jamaah Nusrah al-Islam wal-Muslimin (Group for the support of Islam and Muslims)}. These groups have been individually listed as "Active".
**Emarat Kavkaz: This group has effectively split and its members have joined Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh and Al-Qaida.

6. The Proscribed

In order to determine groups that are perceived to be a threat to international peace and security and are not limited to domestic or national level threats, this project focusses on **"active"** groups that are proscribed by at least 5 entities or countries (including the UN). Upon research it was found that most of the active groups were proscribed by at least one or two countries/entities apart from the UN and in order to portray the global nature of the threat posed by these groups, a threshold of 5 proscribing countries/ entities (including the UN) was taken.

Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB) — 7

UN+ Israel, UAE, New Zealand, UK, USA, Bahrain

Abu Sayyaf Group — 10

UN+ Australia, Canada, the Philippines, New Zealand, UAE, UK, USA, Israel, Bahrain

Afghan Taliban — 5

UN+ Canada, Kazakhstan, New Zealand, Russia

Al Mourabitoun — 7

UN+ UK, USA, Australia, UAE, New Zealand, Bahrain

Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant — 10

UN+ Australia, Canada, Russia, Turkey, UAE, UK, USA, New Zealand, Israel

Al-Qaida — 13

UN+ Australia, Canada, EU, India, Kazakhstan, New Zealand, Russia, UAE, UK, USA, Israel, Bahrain

Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) — 7

UN+ Australia, Canada, UAE, USA, New Zealand, Bahrain

Al-Shabaab — 7

UN+ UAE, UK, USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand

Ansar al-Islam — 9

UN+ Australia, Canada, UK, USA, New Zealand, Pakistan, Israel, Bahrain

Ansar al-Shari'a in Tunisia (AAS-T) 7

UN+ UAE, UK, USA, Tunisia, New Zealand, Bahrain

Ansar Eddine 5

UN+ New Zealand, UAE, USA, Bahrain

Asbat al-Ansar 8

UN+ Canada, UK, USA, New Zealand, Russia, Kazakhstan, Bahrain

Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) 11

UN+ China, Kazakhstan, UAE, UK, Russia, USA, Pakistan, Israel, Bahrain, New Zealand

Forces Democratiques De Liberation Du Rwanda (FDLR) 5

UN+ USA, New Zealand, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Rwanda

Haqqani Network (HQN) 6

UN+ Canada, UAE, UK, USA, New Zealand

Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HuM) 9

UN+ India, Australia, Bahrain, Canada, UK, USA, Israel, New Zealand

Harakat-ul Jihad Islami 8

UN+ Bangladesh, New Zealand (HUJI-B), USA (HUJI-B), Pakistan, India, Israel, Bahrain

Islamic Jihad Group 7

UN+ Bahrain, New Zealand, Pakistan, UAE, UK, USA

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 11

UN+ Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Kazakhstan, UAE, UK, USA, Pakistan, Israel, Bahrain



Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh 14

UN+ Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Egypt, India, Israel, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, UAE, UK, USA, Bahrain

Jaish-i-Mohammed 11

UN+ India, Australia, Canada, UAE, UK, USA, Israel, Bahrain, New Zealand, Pakistan

Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad (Boko Haram) 10

UN+ Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UAE, UK, USA, Nigeria, Israel, Bahrain

Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA) 6

UN+ Pakistan, New Zealand, USA, Australia, Canada

Jemaah Islamiyah 8

UN+ Australia, Canada, UK, USA, New Zealand, Israel, Bahrain

Jemmah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT) 7

UN+ USA, New Zealand, Phillippines, Bahrain, EU (financial sanctions list of 2012), Australia

Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LJ) 9

UN+ Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Canada, UK, USA, Israel, Bahrain

Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) 13

UN+ India, UK, US, Australia, Canada, Kazakhstan, Russia, UAE, Pakistan, India, Bahrain, New Zealand

Mujahidin Indonesian Timur (MIT) 5

UN+ New Zealand, UK, USA, Bahrain

Rajah Solaiman Movement 7

UN+ New Zealand, USA, UK, Israel, Bahrain, Phillipines

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) 8

UN+ Canada, UAE, UK, USA, New Zealand, Pakistan, Bahrain

The Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) 6

UN+ USA, Australia, UAE, New Zealand, Bahrain

Note: Proscribing countries were found through readily available public information.





7. Deadly Linkages

There are various forms of linkages between the 31 terror groups. For example a group could be an off-shoot or a branch. It could receive training or funding from another group. A group could also pledge its allegiance or have an ideological affiliation to another group.

Given below are illustrations of various forms of linkages. Please note that this is not comprehensive and the complexity of the linkages will be further illustrated in the upcoming chapters.

A. Inter-linkages between 4 major terror groups in the world:



B:Inter-linkages between 4 major terror groups in the world and other groups.

Under each major group, the linked terror groups are listed. It must be noted that the linked terror groups often have linkages between or amongst themselves.

Al-Qaida

- Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant
- Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
- Al-Shabaab
- The Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
- Abu Sayyaf Group
- Asbat al-Ansar
- Ansar al-Islam
- Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM)
- Haqqani Network (HQN)
- Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HuM)
- Harakat-ul Jihad Islami
- Jaish-i-Mohammed
- Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT)
- Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA)
- Jemaah Islamiyah
- Jemmah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT)
- Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LJ)
- Ansar al-Shari'a in Tunisia (AAS-T)
- Islamic Jihad Group

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh

- Abu Sayyaf Group
- Ansar al-Islam
- Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant
- Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
- Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad (Boko Haram)
- Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA)
- Jemaah Islamiyah
- Jemmah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT)
- Mujahidin Indonesian Timur (MIT)
- Ansar al-Shari'a in Tunisia (AAS-T)

Afghan Taliban

- Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB)
- Haqqani Network (HQN)
- Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
- Harakat-ul Jihad Islami
- Jaish-i-Mohammed

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

- Haqqani Network (HQN)
- Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
- Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA)
- Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LJ)



C. Each of the below groups is linked to all four others



D. Other Linkages



8. Resilience and Transience

Of the terror groups studied in this work and other similar contemporary research, two models of structure are visible. Certain characteristics lend themselves to ensuring the resilience or longevity of a group, whereas certain characteristics aid in the short life of a group. It is important to note here that the sustenance or resilience or transience in question is of the group itself and its structures – as opposed to its philosophy, beliefs, tactics and methods. The latter may survive if other groups are inspired by them, while the original group itself may dissipate or die out as it is not able to sustain itself.

Model 1: Sustained/Resilient Terror Groups

Characteristics

- Based on strict hierarchical structure (council of elders/leaders; local leaders working under the leadership of regional leaders, who in turn work under the head(s) of group; militaristic model for fighters (battalions, arms stashes, sleeper cells)
- Established and fixed sources of revenue (both legal and illegal sources of revenue to ensure fixed minimal income regardless of actions against the illegal aspects of their revenue generation (such as charitable fund raising; revenue from companies); reliance on a successful business model)
- Established channels of recruitment (madrassas, educational institutions, ethnic connection)
- State/external support/sponsorship (resources, funding, training, etc. provided by a steady source; protection against military or legal actions from/by a state entity)
- Established bases/camps/control of territory over a long term.

Examples

- Al-Qaida and groups associated or inspired by its model – Al-Shabaab, Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad (Boko Haram), Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) etc.
- Jaish-i-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT)
- Afghan Taliban.



Model 2: Transient Terror Groups

Characteristics

- Led by a charismatic/firebrand self-styled leader as opposed to having a wider leadership (thus if the leader is taken out, the group often falls apart)
- Unstable sources of revenue (relying primarily on exploitation of natural resources for revenue, which can be re-captured, for example oil fields)
- Factional rivalry (multiple small factions jockeying for power – leading to a dissolution without a strong leadership in place; in-fighting)
- Rapid changes in structure (mutation/change of the group's operating system in short period of time, damaging its ability to sustain itself; rapid scaling up of group's cadre)
- Lack of long-term base of operations (fighters are dispersed)
- Negotiable, tangible and material goal (often a single issue).

Examples

- Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh
- Single issue groups based in Sahel region such as Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV)

9. The Patrons

Criteria for designating country of base and support

Country/ies of Base

It is a country where any of the following exists:

- Where Headquarters (HQ)/Command/Leadership is situated
- Where majority/sizeable number of the members of the group are based
- Where the group has supplanted state activities/control.

Country/ies of Support

It is a country other than the base countries where any of the following exists:

- Countries where groups find safe havens
- Countries where the following activities take place
  - » Meetings of top leadership
  - » Training camps.

Time Frame

The time period of consideration differs from group to group, however for each group, the most updated and relevant publically available information is taken into consideration. Furthermore, military offensives are on-going against several groups which tend to change the status of the group frequently. In such cases, the time line has been restricted to a snapshot of 2017.

Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB)

Lebanon
(Command and leadership; Majority of members)

Saudi Arabia (Majority of membership)

Egypt (Sizeable number of members)

+

Syria (Training camp)

Abu Sayyaf Group

Philippines (Leadership; Majority of members)

Afghan Taliban

Afghanistan
(Majority of Members; State activities/control)

Pakistan (HQ;Command;Leadership)

Al Mourabitoun

Mali (Leadership; Majority of members)
Algeria (Majority of members)

+ **Libya** (Safe haven)

Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant*

Syria (Majority of members; Operations)
Lebanon (HQ)

Al Qaida (Af-Pak)

Afghanistan (Majority of members)

+ **Pakistan** (Safe haven; Meetings)

Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)

Yemen (Majority of members; Leadership)

Al-Shabaab

Somalia
(Majority of members; Base of operations; Leadership)

+ **Kenya**

Ansar al-Islam

Iraq (Leadership)
Syria (Majority of Members)

Ansar al-Shari'a in Tunisia (AAS-T)

Tunisia (Leadership; Majority of members)
Libya (Sizeable number of members)

Ansar Eddine

Mali (Leadership)

Asbat al-Ansar

Lebanon (HQ; Majority of members)

Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM)

Pakistan (HQ)

+ **Syria** (Training camps)

Forces Democratiques De Liberation Du Rwanda (FDLR)

Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
(HQ; Command; Majority of members)

Haqqani Network (HQN)

Afghanistan
(Majority of members; HQ; State activities/control)

+

Pakistan
(Safe Havens; Meetings; Training camps)

Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HuM)

Pakistan (HQ; Command; Majority of members)

+

Afghanistan (Training camps)

Harakat-ul Jihad Islami

Pakistan (HQ; Command; Majority of members)

Bangladesh (Affiliate)

Islamic Jihad Group

Pakistan (Leadership)

+

Afghanistan (Training camps)

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

Pakistan (HQ; Command)

+

Afghanistan (Safe haven)

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh**

Iraq (Majority of members)

Syria (Majority of members)

Libya (Sizeable number of members)

Egypt (Sizeable number of members)

+

Afghanistan (Safe haven)

Pakistan (Safe haven)

Yemen (Training camps)

Nigeria (Safe haven)

Philippines (Safe haven)

Algeria (Safe haven)

Jaish-i-Mohammed

Pakistan (HQ; Majority of members)

Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad (Boko Haram)***

Nigeria (Command; Majority of members)
Chad (Sizeable number of members)
+
Cameroon (Safe haven)

Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA)

Afghanistan (Leadership; Command; HQ)
Pakistan (Majority of members)

Jemaah Islamiyah

Indonesia (HQ; Command; Majority of members)

Jemmah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT)

Indonesia (HQ; Command; Majority of members)

Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LJ)

Pakistan (HQ; Command; Majority of members)
+
Afghanistan (Training camps)

Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT)

Pakistan (HQ; Command; Majority of members)
+
Afghanistan (Training camps)

Mujahidin Indonesian Timur (MIT)

Indonesia (HQ; Leadership)

Rajah Solaiman Movement

Philippines (HQ; Leadership)

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

Pakistan (HQ; Command; Majority of members)
+
Afghanistan (Safe haven)

The Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb(AQIM)

Mali (Leadership)

***Note: Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant:** As of July 2017, their headquarters and safe haven has been wiped out from Lebanon through military action.

****Note: Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh:** The status of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh is dynamic considering the military offensive that is taking place against the group but also because their objective is to develop homegrown terror networks in various parts of the world. For the purposes of this section, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh base countries are taken as Iraq, Syria, Libya and Egypt, where they have either the leadership or sizeable number of members present. Their official off-shoots (where a group has pledged allegiance and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh core has accepted the same) in other parts of the world are considered as support countries.

*****Note: Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad (Boko Haram):** There was a split in the group in March 2015 and one faction of the group pledged its allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh. This has been taken into consideration while evaluating the support country for Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh.

10. The Patrons Extraordinary

Country	?/31 – Total Number of Groups (Base and Support)	
	Of Base	+ Of Support
Pakistan	14/31	
	Jaish-i-Mohammed; Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LJ); Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT); Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP); Afghan Taliban; Harakat-ul-Mujahidin (HuM); Harakat-ul Jihad Islami; Islamic Jihad Group; Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan; Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM); Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA)	+ Al-Qaida; Haqqani Network (HQN);Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh
Afghanistan	11/31	
	Al-Qaida; Haqqani Network (HQN); Afghan Taliban; Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA)	+ Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LJ); Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT); Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP); Harakat-ul-Mujahidin; Islamic Jihad Group; Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan; Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/ Daesh
Syria	5/31	
	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh; Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant; Ansar al-Islam	+ Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM); Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB)

Indonesia 3/31

Jemaah Islamiyah; Jemmah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT); Mujahidin Indonesian Timur (MIT)

Lebanon 3/31

Asbat al-Ansar; Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB); Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant

Libya 3/31

Ansar al-Shari'a in Tunisia (AAS-T); Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh

+ Al Mourabitoun

Mali 3/31

Al Mourabitoun; Ansar Eddine; The Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

Philippines 3/31

Rajah Solaiman Movement; Abu Sayyaf Group

+ Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh

Algeria 2/31

Al Mourabitoun

+ Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh

Iraq 2/31

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh; Ansar al-Islam

Nigeria 2/31

Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad (Boko Haram)

+ Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh

Yemen 2/31

Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)

+ Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh

Egypt 2/31

Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB);
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh

Bangladesh 1/31

Harakat-ul-Jihad Islami

Chad 1/31

Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad (Boko Haram)

Cameroon 1/31

+ Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad (Boko Haram)

Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) 1/31

Forces Democratiques De Liberation Du Rwanda (FDLR)

Kenya 1/31

+ **Al-Shabaab**

Saudi Arabia 1/31

Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB)

Somalia 1/31

Al-Shabaab

Tunisia 1/31

Ansar al-Shari'a in Tunisia (AAS-T)

Note: The countries providing financial support have not been taken into consideration for determining countries of support.



State Support

State actors play a role in supporting terror groups. A proxy or deniable war, i.e. a war in which a state's institutions or actors do not directly play a role, is seen as a viable alternative to engaging in direct conflict with an enemy state. To this end, states have been known to cultivate, engage with and support terror groups to meet their own agenda.

It is important here to differentiate between support and involvement. 'Support' denotes enhancing the group's ability to act in some shape or form, whereas 'involvement' denotes interfacing with the group. Characteristics of different types of state support include, but are not limited to, the following:

Active

- State helps form the group within its borders
- State directs activities of groups, including missions and targets in other states
- State provides funds, equipment and arms
- State creates a safe haven within its territory for a group to operate with impunity

Tacit

- State does not act against terror groups operating within its borders
- State allows safe havens within its territory for groups to operate with impunity
- State ignores international guidelines, laws and calls for action against the group from relevant international actors
- State institutions have links to groups or group members
- Selective enforcement of legal and law enforcement measures as per convenience

Remote

- State supports groups operating in other states through an export of ideology, money and arms
- State does not take action against institutions within its own territories that support activities of terror groups in other states

Weak State

- State does not possess the capacity or the institutions to take action against groups operating within its borders

11. Safe Havens

A **Safe Haven** can be described as an area/region of relative security for terror groups – due to a lack of oversight/governance (either intentional on the part of government or due to lack of writ of government) – where the group is able to:

- Organize meetings of senior leaders
- Plan and plot major attacks
- Raise funds for their activities
- Carry out recruitment and training
- Regroup
- Move freely with relative ease without interference of law enforcement agencies.

It is important to note that presence of safe havens of a terror group in a nation or a region does not necessarily imply state sponsorship of a terror group.



Safe Havens across the World



Pakistan

North West: FATA, Khyber Pakhtunkhwah
North East: Pakistan Occupied Kashmir
Punjab: North East, Central, South, West
Balochistan: Quetta, Kalat
Sindh-Karachi: Ittehad Town, Binoria Town

Afghanistan

North East: Khost, Paktia, Paktika, Badakhshan, Balkh
South West : Helmand, Kandahar, Farah, Ghor
East : Nangarhar

Bangladesh

South East: Chittagong (coastal and hilly areas), South to the Myanmar border, Cox's Bazaar
West: Riverine Porous Borders with India (West Bengal, Assam And Tripura)

Syria

North West: Aleppo, Idlib, Latakia, Syria-Turkey border
South West: Quneitra, Yarmouk Basin, Daara, Sahl Al-Ghab plains west of Hama
North East

Libya

North: Sirte
North West: Borders with Tunisia

Iraq

North West: Shingal, Kurdistan region

Iran

West: Borders with Iraq

Indonesia

North: Aceh
South: Semarang
South East: Sulawesi, Poso

Philippines

South: Mindanao, Sulu Archipelago, Basilan

Mali

North: Timetrine Region, Tessalit, Adrar Des Ifoghas Mountains, Kidal Region
East: Ansongo, Gao (Bordering Tillaberi region of Niger, Menaka)
West: Telemsi
Central : Timbuktu, Mopti, Ségou

Nigeria

North: Yobe, Kano, Bauchi, Kaduna
North East: Maiduguri, Borno (Sambissa forest)
East: Borders with Cameroon

Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

East: Borders with Rwanda

Kenya

South East: Lamo coastal province

Somalia

Central: Mogadishu, Hiraan region
South: Buaale, Lower Shabelle, Juba Valley, Buulo Gaadud
South East: Middle Shabelle (War-Sheekh)

Tunisia

North East: Kairouan

Chad

South West: Southern basin of Lake Chad

Cameroon

North: Southern basin of Lake Chad

Egypt

Sinai Peninsula

Note: The countries which were identified as the base or support of the 31 UN Sanctioned terror groups and where specific areas could be identified based on the aforementioned criteria of safe havens have been listed.

12. Combatants

Combatant strength varies for every terror group from year to year. Therefore, we have relied on the most recent available data for every group and it is an approximation.

There are several terror groups which have smaller split factions. For the purposes of this section, they have been included as one entity.

1. Combatants: could be any of the following:
1. Foot soldiers / fighters
2. Those that are trained and ready to carry out acts of terror but may not necessarily be deployed
3. Any support personnel involved to help carry out a terror attack/ training.

2. N/A: Information not available through reliable public sources.

Highlights:
- The range of combatants globally is 1,70,450 - 3,15,100.
- As many as 86% of global combatants are present in South Asia.

Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB)

N/A

Abu Sayyaf Group

200 - 600

Afghan Taliban

25000 - 60000

Al Mourabitoun

N/A

Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant*

5000 - 14000

Al-Qaida**

300 - 1000

Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)

1000 - 4000

Al-Shabaab

5000 - 9000



Ansar al-Islam

N/A

Ansar al-Shari'a in Tunisia (AAS-T)

N/A

Ansar Eddine

700

Asbat al-Ansar

650

Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM)

500 - 1500

Forces Democratiques De Liberation Du Rwanda (FDLR)

1500 - 2500

Haqqani Network (HQN)

3000-10000

Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HuM)

300

Harakat-ul Jihad Islami

500- 750

Islamic Jihad Group

100 – 200

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

200 – 3000

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh ***

<3000

Jaish-i-Mohammed

75000

Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad (Boko Haram)

5000

Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA)

N/A

Jemaah Islamiyah

500 - 2000

Jemmah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT)

1500 - 2000

Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LJ)

<500

Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT)

40000 - 120000

Mujahidin Indonesian Timur (MIT)

N/A

Rajah Solaiman Movement

<100

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

1000

The Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

300 - 1000

***Note:** The data for the number of combatants for the "Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant" group is between mid-2016 and mid-2017. The figures are likely to change owing to the active campaign against the group in Syria.

****Note:** For the purposes of this chapter, the group "Al-Qaida" refers to combatants in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It does not refer to/include combatants from Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and The Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

*****Note:** The numbers for "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh" are dynamic and are likely to change as coalition forces recapture territory from the group. The numbers mentioned in this chapter are from December 2017 and only include fighters in Iraq and Syria.



13. The Wealthy

Name of Group

Worth (in USD)

- Salary for Combatants/food, accommodation and other expenses such as health, education
- Salary for family of combatants
- Weapons/military operations
- Recruitment/radicalization
- Propaganda/ideology promotion
- Social Service provision/Charity/help
- State Building/operation/administration
- Bribery/Corruption
- Fund other radical groups

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh

480 to 960 million per annum in 2016
1 billion in 2015
1.5 to 2 billion in 2014

Taliban

400 to 500 million

Al-Qaida

150 million

Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT)

100 - 600 million

Al-Shabaab

50 to 70 million

Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad (Boko Haram)

25 million in 2014 currently uncertain

Note: Many of these groups spend on social service, filling the gap that the state left open. The majority expend their money on combatants' salaries or family expenses.

14. Nuclear Risk

Nuclear risk posed by terror groups can have global or cross regional implications. The criteria to determine capabilities and intentions of terror groups with aspirations to acquire/use nuclear or radioactive material are given below:

Material-Radiological/Nuclear

- Intent to access
- Intent to steal
- Evidence of possession
- Attempt to use
- Attempt to Acquire/Access

Weapons/Facilities

- Threat of attack on a facility/Attack on facility
- Attempt to capture weapons or facility
- Intent to acquire
- Attempt to acquire (knowledge, personnel, capacity)
- Attempt to use

Note: The definition of 'Nuclear material'/'Nuclear facilities' and 'Radioactive Material' is referenced from the 1979 Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

Time frame: 2000-2017

South Asia

Afghan Taliban	Evidence of possession Attempt to use	Intent to acquire
Al-Qaida	Intent to access Attempt to use	Intent to acquire Attempt to acquire
Harakat-ul Jihad Islami	No	Intent to acquire
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan	Evidence of possession	No
Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA)	Intent to access	No
Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LJ)	No	Attempt to capture



South East Asia

Middle East



Africa



Note: *Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh have a base in the Middle East as well as Africa. However, for the purpose of this table, they have been calculated only under the Middle East.

Part 2: Why and How

Backgrounder

The changes in the map of terrorism from 2007 to 2017 have to do with the motives driving acts of terror. When terrorists are driven by material or tangible political objectives, they give up violence once their objectives are achieved. If they are driven by ideological objectives, which may fundamentally disintegrate the present system of states, it is difficult to find solutions. Scott Atran, eminent scholar at the Centre for the Resolution of Intractable Conflicts at Oxford University, has conceived the concept of "sacred values" which are so dear to individuals and groups engaged in terrorism that life is considered a mere subservient device by them. Such individuals and groups are willing to terminate their own life in order to serve what they consider to be the greater cause. We prefer to use the term "core beliefs" to describe what Atran considers "sacred values" with the same substantive interpretation.

In some cases, it is possible to distinguish between tangible objectives and core beliefs, but in others there are thin dividing lines between the two ideas. Lord Alderdice has explained in several of his lectures and speeches that once these lines disappear, the lines between past, present and future also disappear along with lines between geographical entities. Thus, persons consumed by core beliefs tend to be prepared to ignore the differentiating line between life and death (or after life) as they ignore the spatial and time differences. Therefore, history and events in faraway geographical regions can form part of "here and now" to take revenge of the perceived wrong. While in theory dialogue and addressing the 'dignity deficit' can address the psychological obsession with core beliefs, in practice it is impossible to do so because of sustained support to such beliefs by organised vested interests including states, intelligence agencies and criminal networks.

The Jihadi thought processes have proved to be most resilient for almost 150 years, beginning in what is today Pakistan and parts of Afghanistan. During this period, two World Wars took place in Europe, several genocides occurred in Asia and Africa, and other momentous changes took place the world over. Many extremist movements rose and collapsed. But the Jihadi movement has survived in Pakistan and Afghanistan, now firmly spreading to the Middle East and North and West Africa. Some countries in West Africa have undergone dramatic shifts in their social character in a period of ten years from 2007 to 2017. These changes in deep psychology and cultural identities have occurred with active enabling from organised vested interests from outside.

The failure of respondents has been to treat the growth of terrorism as "India-Pakistan problem" or "Middle East problem" or "European problem" or "Nigeria, Mali and Chad problem". Such a failure to address what is essentially a "global problem" can be expected by the "countering" terrorism strategy and ignoring the "deconstructing" terrorism strategy. Though articulation and impact of Jihadi terrorism is local, it is one global phenomenon integrated by an ideology that has been firmly rooted in over 150 years of active movement. Terrorist groups motivated by factors other than Jihadi thinking can be local and escalate or abandon their cause depending



on local factors. IRA needed an Irish solution and FARC needed a Colombian solution. But there is no Moroccan solution for the Moroccan nationals from Morocco or the persons of Moroccan origin from France travelling to Syria to pursue their core belief of establishing a caliphate. The solution may not even be found in Syria, if regime change in Afghanistan and Iraq with many anarchist pockets in the newly constructed states are any indicators. It is necessary to understand the comprehensive nature of historical and geographical, geopolitical and ideological nature of the psychology of terror.

When an individual terrorist drives a truck into innocent children in a market place, it appears to be a lone wolf attack. But is it? There is often a chain of suppliers of training and equipment and supporters arranging hideouts for the culprit. Around this chain is a wider network of providers and buyers of lethal material, market places in the dark net and money transfers. This network is ensconced in a larger worldwide business of terror involving long distance movements of arms, funds and dangerous material.

At the micro level, the target of the global network of terrorists motivated by Jihadi thinking is a specific one. At the macro level, the target is the prevailing international system – not only the system of states but also the system of society based on separation of religion and state, encouragement for individual choice and excellence, and mutual development through exchange. The target of terrorism is the world of opportunity and its objective is to create a world where humanity is constantly at risk. Instead of the world seeking advancement of human civilization, terrorists want to create a world where one kind of injustice is avenged by the brutality of another type of injustice. It is not our case that geopolitical rivalries and wrong policies of the states do not inflict injustice. They do, but in moving away from a system where such injustice can be addressed in a manner that can heal wounds and begin a new chapter of human relations. Whereas the terrorists want to create a non-system where the fabric of all human relations is dissolved.

The most dangerous aspect of this phenomenon is the intent and effort of some terrorist groups to acquire material or weapons of mass destruction. If they succeed in doing so, they may put an end to the world as it has evolved over the last ten thousand years, despite wars, death and revival. Once a radiological weapon is used by a terrorist group in a large city, releasing doses of radioactivity, it will be the beginning of the end of human civilization. And once terrorists capture a state possessing nuclear weapons, humanity will be at infinite risk.

Is such fear exaggerated? Terrorists are known for eating the hand that feeds them. There are several examples of the terrorist groups turning against their supporters. Therefore, any state that supports terrorism for short term political gains is at the risk of being captured by terrorists in the long term, along with its assets, weapons and nuclear arms, if it has any. In Iraq and Syria, terrorists have captured dams and reservoirs and have converted them into water bombs. In Pakistan, an interdependent relationship between state institutions and terrorist groups has grown over the years, in a manner much more transparent than the safe house in Abbottabad. The risk of the capture of nuclear weapons by terrorist groups cannot be ruled out in the long run, unless all infrastructure of terror is demolished, and the psychology of terror is addressed constructively. Pakistan has specific grievances with India and Afghanistan. But to infest its entire neighbourhood with terrorism allowing it to spread across the world through ideology, manpower and dark net, not ruling out the risk of the capture of its state and strategic assets, is placing humanity at risk for narrow gains. Pakistan is not the only state to engage into mutual dependence and mutual risk with terror groups. There are other states and much greater powers that have also displayed this tendency. It is not a time for blaming one state or another. It is time for the international community act in concert to demolish the infrastructure of terror anywhere and everywhere in the world.

1. Evolution

Syed Ahmad Shahid - Founder of concept of 'Jihad in Action' (1784-1831)
Created force of 700 hard core fighters and shifted to Hazara via Sindh, Kandahar, Kabul and Peshawar. Formation of 'Panchdhar', the first Islamic State in the Jihadi Narrative

Mohammad Qasim Nanotavi - Founder of Deoband School (1833-1880)

Foundation for prominent Islamist schools of thought in the 18th and 19th centuries namely Deoband, Nadva, Jamat-e-Islami, Jamiat-e-Ahle Hadis

Rise of the Darul Uloom Haqqania of Akora Khattak in Pakistan which became the ideological centre and feeding ground for Al-Qaida and the Taliban

Abul Ala Maududi (1903-1979)
Advocated "Islamising" various socio-political structures in a state as a pre-cursor to an Islamic state

Influence of Sayyid Qutb and his brand of political Islam (1906-1966)

Abdullah Azzam (1941-1989)
Propagated the obligation to fight infidels occupying Muslim lands as an individual duty of every able bodied Muslim

Involvement of multiple state institutions from the United States and Pakistan, including the Pakistani Army, US Central Intelligence Agency and successive governments in Pakistan (1970s-90s)

Many Al-Qaida inspired groups

Regional Al-Qaida affiliates

Jaish-i-Mohammed
Group appeals for Jihad against the US, UK, France and Europe labelling them as enemies to expatriate Muslims

Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/ Daesh

Jaish-i-Mohammed Group appeals for Jihad against the US, UK, France and Europe labelling them as enemies to expatriate Muslims

Jaish-i-Mohammed calls for soldiers to be inspired by Syed Ahmad Shahid and the idea of the first Islamic State, Panchdhar

Jaish-i-Mohammed
Leader Talhe-As Saif propagates a narrative advocating fidayeen attacks by a single person on macro-targets



2. Goals

Definitions:

1. **Tangible goals:** Goals that are difficult to achieve due to complex geopolitical environments but are compatible with current reality. This could include a separatist movement, ridding the region of Western interests and foreign occupation, overthrow of a regime or government, greater autonomy, more representation in the security forces, secessionist movement, and targeting religious sects or security officials.
2. **Material Goals:** Goals that involve personal gains and profiteering.
3. **Political Goals:** Political aspirations including greater representation in the government, formation of a political party, and overthrowing a regime.
4. **Core Beliefs:** Goals that are central or foundational to a group, and involve the achievement of an ideal that is fundamentally incompatible with current reality including the establishment of a caliphate (global or within a particular country or region), waging jihad as an individual duty, imposing Sharia law, dismantling of the system of states, and transformation of states into Islamist nations.

Note 1: One goal may not necessarily imply the other and vice versa. For example, in the case of overthrowing of a regime: a political goal can be tangible, however, all tangible goals are not necessarily political. Tangible, political and material goals can overlap with each other; however, a goal based in core beliefs does not fall under any of the other goals.

Note 2: Core beliefs build upon the concept of "sacred values" developed by Professor Scott Atran.

Note 3: A group usually has a combination of one or more tangible goals in additional to core beliefs.

Groups and their Goals:

Region	Groups with Tangible Goals	Groups with Material Goals	Groups with Political Goals	Groups with Core Beliefs as Goals
Middle East	5		3	6
South East Asia	2	1		4
South Asia	11	1	4	12
Africa	4		3	6

Highlights:

- Globally, 28 out of 31 groups have a core belief as their goal. Among these 28, the maximum number of groups is in South Asia, forming nearly 41 per cent of the total number of groups.
- Globally, 22 out of 31 groups have tangible goals. Some tangible goals have been counted under political goals and vice versa.



● Tangible Goals ● Material Goals ● Political Goals ● Core Beliefs

Middle East

Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB)*	●	●	●
Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant	●	●	●
Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)	●		●
Ansar al-Islam	●		●
Asbat al-Ansar	●	●	●
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh*			●

South East Asia

Abu Sayyaf Group		●	●
Jemaah Islamiyah			●
Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT)			●
Mujahidin Indonesian Timur (MIT)	●		
Rajah Solaiman Movement	●		●



South Asia

Afghan Taliban	● ● ●
Al-Qaida	● ●
East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM)	● ● ●
Haqqani Network (HQN)	● ● ● ●
Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM)	●
Harakat-ul Jihad Islami	● ●
Islamic Jihad Group	●
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan	●
Jaish-i-Mohammed	● ●
Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA)	● ● ●
Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LJ)	● ●
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT)	● ●
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	● ●

Africa

Al Mourabitoun	● ●
Al-Shabaab	●
Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia (AAS-T)	●
Ansar Eddine	● ● ●
Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad (Boko Haram)	●
Forces Democratiques De Liberation Du Rwanda (FDLR)	● ●
The Organization Of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)	● ● ●

Note: *The groups Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB) and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh have a base in the Middle East as well as Africa. However, for the purpose of this table, they have been calculated only under the Middle East.

3. Resolution and its Impossibility

Third party involvement, here referring to a state or its infrastructure, in the actions a terror group, infinitely complicates any attempts to resolve the situation. Even when groups have tangible goals, as opposed to ones that are based solely on core beliefs, if the group's actions are in any way supported or sponsored by a third-party state, it is seen that there is incentive to prolong the conflict endlessly.

1. **Group with tangible goals in direct conflict with one or more states**
   - Even with tangible goals that are complex to achieve, negotiation is possible if:
     - State(s) and group are able to address tangible goal at the dialogue table
   - For example, in the Sahel region, Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV), both focused on returning control of Nigeria's oil resources to the local people, have shown themselves to be amenable to talks and laying down of arms.

2. **Group with goals based in core beliefs in direct conflict with one or more states**
   - When goals are based solely on core beliefs, negotiation is not possible often as:
     - Goals are fundamentally incompatible with present/modern reality.
   - For example, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh (whose primary goal is establishment of a global caliphate). In 2014, the chief of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Daesh), Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, announced the establishment of a "caliphate" in Syria and Iraq. The group's then spokesman stated that "The legality of all emirates, groups, states and organisations becomes null by the expansion of the caliph's authority and the arrival of its troops to their areas."

3. **Group with tangible goals in conflict with a state but with the support/sponsorship of a third party state**
   - Group's tangible goals are complex to achieve but their actions are driven by the support or sponsorship of a third party state, it may not be possible to resolve as:
     - Interference of the third party state is usually based on a different agenda (often the instability of the first state).
   - However, if the third party state willingly removes its own agenda from the situation, it may be possible to resolve. For example, the Northern Ireland Peace Process; it has been posited that the removal of their own strategic and economic interests by the British from the situation was an important step towards achieving the peace agreement.

4. **Group with goals based in core beliefs in conflict with one or more states but with the support/sponsorship of a third party state**
   - Groups with goals based on core beliefs which also have the support/sponsorship of third party states are unlikely to negotiate as the likelihood of these groups being induced to dialogue or resolution is extremely low.



4. Casting the Net

	South Asia	South East Asia	Middle East*	Africa*
Printed Publishing Material	4	1	2	1
Charity Organisations	2	0	0	2
Internet Based Propaganda Unit	6	0	4	3
On the Ground Recruitment (cafes, mosques, gyms)	3	3	5	4
Candidature and Recommendation by a trusted source	1	1	1	0
Military Courses	2	1	3	0
Provide Social Services	0	2	1	0
Madrassas/Educational Programmes	8	2	0	1
Ethnic Connection	3	1	5	2
Abduction	0	0	0	2
Prisons	1	1	3	1
Refugee Camps	1	0	3	2

Time Frame: 2010-until present

Note: *The groups Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB) and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh have a base in the Middle East as well as Africa. However, for the purpose of this table, they have been calculated only under the Middle East.

- Regular recruitment is fundamental to sustaining the operations of terror groups
- South Asia reflects a blend of traditional means of recruitment through madrassa network coupled with modern means of recruitment like conducting internet based propaganda.
- Groups from the Middle East point towards the presence of physical infrastructure to recruit fighters and supporters on the ground along with a rooted ethnic solidarity that favours the recruitment process.
- Abduction stands out as a divergent means of recruitment that is peculiar to some African groups.

Internet and the globalization of terror

Internet can be a powerful tool for terror groups as it offers to breakdown geographical barriers often providing terror groups with a global pool of recruits. Internet is used by terror groups for propaganda, radicalization and recruitment purposes. The Internet can be an effective medium to recruit minors and target vulnerable and marginalized groups in society. Therefore propaganda via the Internet may take the form of cartoons, popular music videos or computer games as well as capitalise on the individual's feelings of injustice or humiliation.

Internet can serve as a secure means of communication. Terror groups have been seen to be using encryption software to secure their communication and online recruitment forums. Internet can also be a favourable medium for fundraising, as well as for training and planning purposes. The internet can offer logistical advantage by serving as a medium for conducting illegal activities without being detected by law enforcement agencies. Internet may also facilitate the planning and execution of a terror attack as it can greatly help in acquiring required information, as well as materials necessary for the execution of the attack



5. The Pawns

Analysis of demographic targets of recruitment for the terror groups shows:

- The largest target group in nearly all the geographies is youth, predominantly young men. In South Asia, groups also tend to target professionals and women. This indicates the widening of the social base of their operations.
- Amongst the African groups, linkages through ethnic backgrounds play an important role in recruitment. Apart from this, African groups also tend towards targeting unemployed youth.
- In the Middle East, apart from targeting youth through existing channels of radicalization, freed prisoners were also targeted during the war in Iraq and Syria.

	South Asia	South East Asia	Middle East*	Africa*
Youth (Recruited by existing channels of radicalisation e.g. madrassas)	11	3	4	0
Professionals/Educated Youth	4	0	1	0
Same Ethnic Background	1	1	2	6
Fighters/Mercenaries	1	0	2	1
Children	2	0	0	3
Forcibly Freed Prisoners	0	1	3	1
Unemployed Youth/Farmers	3	1	1	4
Women	4	0	1	2

Note: *The groups Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB) and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh have a base in the Middle East as well as Africa. However, for the purpose of this table, they have been calculated only under the Middle East.

6. Receipts

Total number of groups considered for evaluation of Modes of Revenue = 31



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NOTE: Hawala is a medium to transfer money and not method of revenue generation in itself. Therefore, it has been removed from the section. The money that is transacted through hawala could have been generated using various methods including donations, kidnapping for ransom, legal front companies, drugs, counterfeit or from other extremist organizations. There are 6 groups from 31 groups that showed evidence of using hawala as a medium to transfer money and that are:

6 Groups using hawala to transfer money



Control over Natural Resources

Terror groups tend to use the production and trade of natural resources such as oil, diamonds, gold, tin, talc, chromite and marble amongst other for things financing their operations. When terror groups have control over territory or are present in conflict areas or regions where there is little or no governmental control, they are often seen to indulge in profiteering from the production and trade of natural resources which is present in the region and this is done through complex operations of smuggling and finance. This has global implications due to the fact that while the resource itself has a global value, they also strengthen the terror network and involve several countries across the region. For example, Al-Shabaab's control and export of coal traces its route from Somalia to UAE. Afghan Taliban's control over Talc mines is seen to have brought a sum of about 22 million USD to the group, and the resource itself moves from Afghanistan to Pakistan and then to European nations.

7. Payments

The top source of expenditure of terrorist groups is the payment for salaries/food/medicine/ health and family welfare to their recruited combatants. Most estimates are that terrorist groups spend less than 10% of their income on actually conducting attacks.

Kinds of Payments	Amount in USD

The case of South Asian terror groups

Payment at the time of joining - for a foreign fighter	Upto 800
Payment at the time of joining - for a local fighter	Upto 400
Salary of a foreign fighter	155 p/m
Salary of a local fighter	185 p/m
Payment after completion of an assignment	125 to 3,900
Payment for carrying out major attacks	1550 to 15,540
Payment to the topmost leaders	Upto 800 p/m
Commission for recruitment	80 to 160/recruit



The case of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh

Salary in 2015 for a foreign combatant	1400 p/m + 100 p/m per wife + 35-50 p/m per child + 50 p/m per parent
Salary of Local fighter (single)	72 p/m
Salary of a Local 26 years old combatant, married with 3 Children	184 p/m
Salary of a 55 year old combatant, married with 6 children	256 p/m
Salary last month before capture of Mosul - 2017	Max 300
Commission for recruitment	2,000 to 10,000 USD (depending on the skill of combatant recruited)

8. Global Business

Terror groups fund their operations through diverse sources. In some cases their operations are financed by methods executed within their area of control, for example: extortion, exploitation of natural resources, kidnapping for ransom, etc. However, there are other methods used to fund terror involving well-coordinated operations between two or more geographical regions. In this regard, the use of Hawala and certain legal fronts/money laundering are seen to be the two most prominent methods of financing terror where two or more geographical regions interact making the business of terror international. Other prominent sources of income which are cross-regional are drug trafficking and charitable organizations and they have been further explored in later parts of this document.

a) Hawala / Money transfer

Hawala, which means “transfer” in Arabic, is an informal transaction system based largely on mutual trust. The way the system works is as follows: An individual in country A gives money to a hawala broker, known as a hawalader, in country A. That hawalader then contacts a hawalader operating in country B and informs the hawalader to give a certain amount of money to a specific individual in country B. Codes are provided by all parties to ensure that the money is delivered to the proper recipient.

Prominent cross-regional financial routes

b) Legal fronts/Money laundering



9. Drug Trafficking

Up to 60 per cent of terror groups are connected in some fashion with the illegal narcotics trade to fund their operations.



10. Charitable Groups

The UN Consolidated Sanctions List also gives the name of the charitable groups linked to terrorist organizations. These groups have global implications as they operate out of different countries and are linked to groups that operate globally or are a threat to international peace and security.

Charitable Group
Affiliated Terror Group
Country Office

Afghan Support Committee
Al-Qaida
Afghanistan, Pakistan

Al Furqan
Al-Qaida
Bosnia and Herzegovina

Al Rashid Trust
Al-Qaida
Pakistan

Al-Akhtar Trust International
i. Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HuM)
ii. Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LJ)
iii. Lashkar-e-Tayyiba(LeT)
Afghanistan, Pakistan

Al-Haramain & Al Masjed Al-Aqsa Charity Foundation
Al-Qaida
Bosnia and Herzegovina

Al-Haramain Foundation
Al-Qaida
Indonesia, Pakistan, Union of Comoros

Benevolence International Foundation

Al-Qaida

Bangladesh, Gaza, Sudan, USA, Yemen

Global Relief Foundation

Al-Qaida

Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Eritrea, Ethiopia, India, Iraq, West Bank and Gaza, Somalia, Syria, USA

Hilal Ahmar Society Indonesia

i. Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant
ii. Jemaah Islamiyah
iii. Al-Qaida

Indonesia

Rabita Trust

Al-Qaida

Pakistan

Revival Of Islamic Heritage Society

Al-Qaida

Afghanistan, Pakistan

Taibah International-Bosnia Offices

Al-Qaida

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Tous Pour La Paix Et Le Developpement

Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

Ummah Tameer E-Nau

Al-Qaida

Pakistan

Wafa Humanitarian Organization

Al-Qaida

Afghanistan, Kuwait, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, UAE

Prominent Cross-Regional Financial Routes through Charitable Organizations

11. The Modus Operandi

Current/New Trends

- Strike outside the boundaries of cause/control
- Less complex and unsophisticated attacks
- Decentralised planning of attack
- Lone wolf attacks
- Use of vehicles as weapons
- Low cost but high impact attacks
- Soft and random targets
- Locally radicalised actors
- Use of smaller weapons
- Increased use of suicide bombing
- Women and children suicide bombers
- Hit and run tactic



12. State Capture

State Capture comprises of two elements:

Control over territory (CT): Any physical control over territory by the terror group and not mere presence. Hence, presence in areas which act like safe havens is not taken into consideration.

and/ or

Governance of territory (GT): By replicating essential functions of a state/government. This could include any of the following:

- De facto governance – taxes, judicial functions, police
- Participation in political process
- Imposing some form of Islamic law
- Charitable/Humanitarian Work
- Control over schools/Healthcare.

Time Frame: 2015-2017

Observations

- Of the 31 groups 11 are involved in 'state capture'. All the groups have some form of governance such as judicial, political and social, although not all may have territorial control.
- Not all the 11 groups have territorial control as well as governance. The 6 groups that have both territory and governance, seem to be replicating state functions as the writ of the state does not exist in the area.
- The governance functions are also seen as a way to establish a base and get support from the local population.

Name of Group	Type	Countries where the territory is under control/Governed	Type of governance*
Middle East			
Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant	CT+GT	Syria	Judicial and other services
Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)	CT+GT	Yemen	Political, Judicial, Taxes and other Services
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant(ISIL)/Daesh**	CT+GT	Syria, Iraq	Judicial services, Taxes, Health care, Education, Telecommunications, Enforcement of religious laws
Africa			
Al-Shabaab	CT+GT	Somalia	Judicial, Taxation, Education, Health Care, Humanitarian aid
Ansar al-Shari'a in Tunisia (AAS-T)	GT	Tunisia	Health Care, Humanitarian Services
Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad (Boko Haram)	CT+GT	Cameroon, Chad, Nigeria	Taxes, Enforcement of religious laws
Asia			
Afghan Taliban	CT+GT	Afghanistan	Judicial, Taxation, Healthcare, Education, Enforcement of religious laws
Haqqani Network (HQN)	GT	Pakistan	Judicial, Taxation
Jaish-i-Mohammed	GT	Pakistan	Education, Health care, Humanitarian aid
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba(LeT)	GT	Pakistan	Education, Healthcare, Charity, Participation in political process
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	GT	Pakistan	Enforcement of religious laws

* Please note that the type of governance is not exhaustive.
** Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh: Given the nature of the group, only the core countries (Syria, Iraq) are taken into consideration to determine state capture and governance.

13. Critical Infrastructure

Critical infrastructures are those vital services, assets and cyber networks, which are essential for the maintenance of safety, security, public health and economy of a country and for the functioning of key government responsibilities.

- Not all critical infrastructures are similarly "critical": Critical infrastructure is, by nature, related to systems and services that are essential to the functioning of normal life. "Critical" refers to infrastructure that provides an essential support for economic and social wellbeing, for public safety and for the functioning of key government responsibilities, such that disruption or destruction of the infrastructure would result in catastrophic and far-reaching damage.
- Interdependencies within critical infrastructure: For example, the water sector has interdependencies with a wide range of other sectors: the energy sector needs hydropower dams to provide power; the emergency services sector relies on the water sector for firefighting water supply, water access in the event of a significant disaster.
- Sectors of critical infrastructure: Chemical, Telecommunications, Defence, Emergency, Energy, Financial, Government facilities, Healthcare, Transport, Water, Cyber space.

Cyber Terrorism

- A trend which can be identified in critical infrastructure protection policies is the increased focus on cyber-related threats and vulnerabilities. Recent initiatives undertaken by countries like the US and France, as well as international organizations like NATO, are guided by the concern that the information and communication infrastructure are increasingly vulnerable not only due to their extremely dense cyber connectivity, but also due to both the state's and society's dependency on them. The main aim of governmental efforts is to better secure networks against intrusion, and to do so collectively. However, the current response to tackle cyber terrorism seems to be overrated as compared to the present reality. Incidents of terror groups carrying out cyber terrorism are few and far between.
- A threat of a cyber-attack by a terror group which disrupts or damages the working of a critical infrastructure is very low. At present cyber-attacks are mostly carried out by a state actor against another state and this is referred to as cyber warfare. A cyber-attack does not create awe and fear among the public as compared to an attack on physical public utility such as trains. To launch a cyber-attack requires skilled personnel, high level of sophistication and equipment which terror groups are still lacking.

KEY: Below Key is for the following table which denotes attacks carried out by terror groups against critical infrastructure

1. Chemical: includes chemical plants, nuclear plants
2. Communications: cellular towers, base stations, satellite and telephone connections
3. Defence: army base, military barracks, military camp, military airbase, security checkpoints, security outposts, paramilitary camps
4. Emergency services: Police stations, police training centers and academies, police headquarters, fire department
5. Energy: oil and/or gas stations, electricity pipelines, oil and gas pipelines, oil refineries, mines
6. Financial: banks
7. Government facilities: Parliamentary buildings, courts, embassies, consulates, UN facilities and compounds, NATO convoys
8. Health: hospitals, healthcare facilities
9. Transport: bridges, government owned buses and trains (not carrying tourists), airplanes, airport, containers, cargo ships, patrol boats, ports, navy vessels, oil tankers
10. Water: dams; water pipes, boreholes, power stations, sanitation plants
11. Cyber: hacking government databases.

Time Frame: 2012 to 2017



Attacks by terror groups against Critical Infrastructure = 31



Note: *The groups Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB) and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh have a base in the Middle East as well as Africa. However, for the purpose of this table, they have been calculated only under the Middle East.

Part 3: Indicant

Backgrounder

In order to identify long term risks to humanity from terrorism, it is important to focus on the groups that have resilience and a strong support base. The strength of a group depends on its manpower, financial resources, weapons, determination and support from state structures. Among these factors, financial resources and weapons in hand are transient variables. The drop in the revenue of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh in a couple of years is an important indicator. If a terrorist group manages to appeal to a large number of people to join it as a combatant or armed member, it shows the potential of such a group to cause harm in the long run.

In order to assess future risks, it is necessary to measure the armed strength of terrorist groups. It is also necessary to examine their intent to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction. The stronger a group is in terms of attracting armed members, the greater the risk it poses to humanity. If a group intends to acquire nuclear weapons, its risk potential multiplies by several times.

The Global Terror Threat Indicant (GTTI) therefore places emphasis on the number of the active combatants or armed members, which are interchangeable realities, and the interest demonstrated or efforts made by a group to acquire nuclear weapons or attack or capture nuclear plants. The GTTI Scale is a function of the product of combatant strength and nuclear intent.

It also identifies countries on a comparative scale in terms of their support for terror groups either by offering base or support in the form of safe havens, and otherwise.

A scale in the constantly changing ecology of terror cannot be a perfect measurement. Combatants move from one group to another and from one geography to another. Objectives, strategy and lethal intent also keep changing. Therefore no scale can be perfect. The purpose of GTTI Scale is not to offer a detailed analytical tool to assess mathematically accurate strength of terror groups. It is to indicate the groups and supporting countries that need to be watched in future if the growth of terrorism is to be contained.



1. The GTTI Scale

Methodology

Each group's combatant strength or the range is already provided in the document. When there is a range, the median is taken. When combatant strength is not available (N/A) the value is taken as 1000. However if the group poses nuclear threat then the combatant strength is multiplied by 10.

GTTI Scale of Terror Groups: 1- 10

The GTTI Scale of a terror group is calculated based on the combatant strength of each group. A value between 1 and 10 is assigned based on the product of the combatant strength and potential nuclear risk calculated as mentioned above.

Combatant Strength and Nuclear Risk	Value on Scale
<500	1
500-999	2
1000-1999	3
2000-4999	4
5000-9999	5
10,000-24999	6
25000-49999	7
50000-74999	8
75000-99999	9
>100,000	10

GTTI score of a country: Sum total of GTTI Scale of each terror group which has a base in that country + half of the sum total of GTTI Scale of each terror group which has support in that country

GTTI Scale of Terror Groups

10

- **Afghan Taliban**
- **Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT)**

9

- **Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant**
- **Jaish-i-Mohammed**

8

- **Al-Shabaab**
- **Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad (Boko Haram)**

7

- **Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) / Daesh**

6

- **Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan**
- **Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA)**
- **Jemaah Islamiyah**
- **Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)**

5

- **Al-Qaida**
- **Harakat-ul Jihad Islami**
- **Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LJ)**
- **Haqqani Network (HQN)**

4

- Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
- Forces Democratiques De Liberation Du Rwanda (FDLR)

3

- Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB)
- Al Mourabitoun
- Ansar al-Islam
- Ansar al-Shari'a in Tunisia (AAS-T)
- Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM)
- Jemmah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT)
- Mujahidin Indonesian Timur (MIT)

2

- Ansar Eddine
- Asbat al-Ansar
- The Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

1

- Abu Sayyaf Group
- Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HuM)
- Islamic Jihad Group
- Rajah Solaiman Movement

GTTI Score of Countries



GTTI Workings

Terror Group (With Nuclear Risk Marked in red)	**Number of Combatants**	**Number of Combatants** (Median)	**Product of Combatants and Nuclear Risk**	**GTTI Scale**
Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB)	N/A	1000	1000	3
Abu Sayyaf Group	200 – 600	400	400	1
Afghan Taliban	25,000 – 60,000	42500	425000	10
Al Mourabitoun	N/A	1000	1000	3
Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant	5000-14000	9500	95000	9
Al-Qaida	300- 1000	650	6500	5
Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)	1000 – 4000	2500	2500	4
Al-Shabaab	5000 – 9000	7000	70000	8
Ansar al-Islam	N/A	1000	1000	3
Ansar al-Shari'a in Tunisia (AAS-T)	N/A	1000	1000	3
Ansar Eddine	700	700	700	2
Asbat al-Ansar	650	650	650	2
Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM)	500– 1500	1000	1000	3
Forces Democratiques De Liberation Du Rwanda (FDLR)	1500 – 2500	2000	2000	4
Haqqani Network (HQN)	3000-10,000	6500	6500	5
Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HuM)	300	300	300	1
Harakat-ul Jihad Islami	500- 750	625	6250	5
Islamic Jihad Group	100 – 200	150	150	1
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan	200 – 3000	1600	16000	6
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh	<3000	3000	30000	7
Jaish-i-Mohammed	75000	75000	75000	9
Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad (Boko Haram)	5,000	5000	50000	8
Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA)	N/A	1000	10000	6
Jemaah Islamiyah	500 – 2000	1250	12500	6

Jemmah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT)	1500-2000	1750	1750	3
Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LJ)	<500	500	5000	5
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT)	40,000 – 120,000	80000	800,000	10
Mujahidin Indonesian Timur (MIT)	N/A	1000	1000	3
Rajah Solaiman Movement	<100	100	100	1
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	1000	1000	10000	6
The Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)	300-1000	650	650	2

NOTE: All terror groups which pose a nuclear risk are marked in red.

GTTI Score of Countries

Country — GTTI Score — **(GTTI calculation)**

Of Base + Of Support = ?/31

Total Number of Groups (Base and Support)

Pakistan — 70.5 — **62 + (17/2)**

Afghan Taliban; 10
Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HuM); 1
Harakat-ul Jihad Islami; 5
Islamic Jihad Group; 1
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan; 6
Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM); 3
Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA); 6
Jaish-i-Mohammed; 9
Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LJ); 5
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT); 10
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP); 6

+

Al-Qaida; 5
Haqqani Network (HQN); 5
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh; 7

= 14/31



Afghanistan — 44 — 26 + (36/2)

Al-Qaida; 5
Haqqani Network (HQN); 5
Afghan Taliban; 10
Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA) 6

+

Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LJ); 5
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT); 10
Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP); 6
Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HuM); 1
Islamic Jihad Group; 1
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan; 6
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh; 7

= 11/31

Syria — 22 — 19 + (6/2)

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh; 7
Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant; 9
Ansar al-Islam; 3

+

Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM); 3
Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB); 3

= 5/31

Lebanon — 14 — 14

Asbat al-Ansar; 2
Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB); 3
Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant; 9

+

= 3/31

Indonesia — 12 — 12

Jemaah Islamiyah; 6
Jemmah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT); 3
Mujahidin Indonesian Timur (MIT); 3

+

= 3/31

Libya — 11.5 — 10 + (3/2)

Ansar al-Shari'a in Tunisia (AAS-T); 3
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh; 7

+

Al Mourabitoun; 3

= 3/31

Nigeria — 11.5 — 8 + (7/2)

Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad (Boko Haram); 8

+

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh; 7

= 2/31

Egypt — 10 — **10**

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh; 7

Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB); 3

\+ = 2/31

Iraq — 10 — **10**

Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh; 7

Ansar al-Islam; 3

\+ = 2/31

Chad — 8 — **8**

Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad (Boko Haram); 8

\+ = 1/31

Somalia — 8 — **8**

Al-Shabaab; 8

\+ = 1/31

Yemen — 7.5 — **4 + (7/2)**

Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP); 4

\+ Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh ; 7 = 2/31

Mali — 7 — **7**

Al Mourabitoun; 3

Ansar Eddine; 2

The Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb(AQIM); 2

\+ = 3/31


Algeria
6.5
3 + (7/2)
Al Mourabitoun; 3
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh; 7
2/31
Philippines
5.5
2 + (7/2)
Rajah Solaiman Movement; 1
Abu Sayyaf Group; 1
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh; 7
3/31
Bangladesh
5
5
Harakat-ul-Jihad Islami; 5
1/31
Cameroon
4
8/2
Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad (Boko Haram); 8
1/31
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
4
4
Forces Democratiques De Liberation Du Rwanda (FDLR); 4
1/31
Kenya
4
8/2
Al-Shabaab; 8
1/31
Saudi Arabia
3
3
Abdallah Azzam Brigades(AAB); 3
1/31
Tunisia
3
3
Abdallah Azzam Brigades(AAB); 3
1/31

2. Conclusions

The construction of the GTTI Scale helps to understand realities and future threats which are different from the scenario that is portrayed in the mainstream media. The lethality of terrorist groups depends on their combatant strength, support of organised entities aligned with states or criminal networks, and proclivity to acquire weapons of mass destruction. If we follow trend-lines rather than headlines, we find that Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Taliban, Jaish-i-Mohammed are much greater risk to humanity than ISIL or Daesh at this stage. Indeed, even Al-Nusrah Front and Al-Shabaab are greater threat than Daesh. Nevertheless, greater attention is focussed on Daesh than the groups that can threaten humanity on a large scale.

If we look at the most dangerous terrorist groups, based on hard facts and statistics, we find that Pakistan hosts or aids majority of them. Also, there are a significant number of groups based in Afghanistan, which operate with the support of Pakistan. Thus, Pakistan is responsible for 3 times the terror risk to humanity that Syria poses, or more than 5 times the risk that Libya poses, and 7 times the risk that Iraq poses.

The mainstream media in the world concentrates on the threats that are immediate and closest to Western interests. Therefore, they are obsessed with terrorist groups in the Middle East or the groups that occasionally operate in Europe and America with the help of their networks in the Middle East. The Middle East is of critical importance to Western countries for strategic, historical, religious and economic reasons, and therefore attention given to the terrorist groups in that part of the world is natural. The terrorist groups operating in the areas of higher strategic and economic importance are dangerous, but they have to be realistically compared with terrorist groups operating in areas of less strategic importance and having greater strength in terms of man-power and material support. In the long run, the groups that have the wherewithal to sustain will have an impact on the ability of states to conduct international relations in a civil manner.

In addressing the threat of terrorism states tend to adopt a tactical approach focussing on what they consider is of immediate importance. As we saw in this report, the lines between terrorist groups are difficult to draw, as capital and labour of the terror economy flows from one geography to another. Thus, while the states have disaggregated strategy governed by their individual interests, the terrorist groups have an integrated approach linking them with each other and criminal networks across the world. If states have to succeed in dealing with terrorism, they need to understand how the minds of terrorists work at the micro-level and how the forces of terrorism are globally inter-connected at the macro-level. It is only with comprehensive and holistic understanding of the threat of terrorism that any effective and preventive response strategy will be feasible.

3. Scenarios

Hookah Bars

By 2020, the division of the Middle East-North Africa region is accentuated. In one camp are Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt, Israel and the United States. In the other camp are Iran, Turkey, Qatar, Sudan, Lebanon and Russia. The rival camps use militias and terrorist groups to expand their power base in Syria and Libya in particular and the entire region in general. The hookah bars of Beirut and Cairo, Istanbul and Isfahan are filled with smoke. It's the smoke of fear through which people are seeing the next war.

At the same time, the United States and Russia are involved in a political and military competition to control Eastern Ukraine. They too use proxies in the form of militias and terrorist groups.

The concentration on winning battles in the rubble of Syria, Eastern Ukraine and Libya results in the neglect of the real problem. The US led coalition had defeated Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh in Raqqa, its capital in Syria, and Sirte, its capital in Libya and killed or driven the Isis cadres out. But now the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) / Daesh regroups in different parts of Africa, Afghanistan and the Southeast Asia. At the same time the Al-Qaida expands and deepens it base in different parts of the world. Its partner organisations in Pakistan flourish with state support. Pakistan is sometimes condemned for allowing terrorist groups to operate on its territory. But in an international political framework where

non-state organisations are used as instruments of political violence by the states, such condemnation is only superficial.

The competing geopolitical ambitions result in selective approaches to treating political violence. Terrorism for one is freedom fight for someone else, as the old adage goes. The deep-rooted sense of humiliation is not addressed. Wherever there is the possibility of political solutions through dialogue and respect for perspectives of the other, there is reduction of violence. But where political solutions are not possible, deficit of dignity expands in the mind of the terrorists, seeking justice for the community. The ideology of Jihad makes it possible to define the community as something global. Therefore, perceived injustice in Syria motivates young men in the Philippines and Pakistan or Morocco and Mali to join suicide missions. Just as geographical borders disappear, so do historical periods. Injustice may not have been inflicted today. Something that happened a few decades or several centuries ago evokes anger.

As the 2020s progress, terrorist groups gradually change their strategy. The security agencies are prepared for attacks on the land and in the air. But the terrorist groups target strategic canals and straits. They attempt to sabotage the command and control station of the Panama Canal and take over ships in the Strait of Malacca. Some of their efforts succeed, such as the one in Malacca, but some fail like those in the Panama Canal. Nevertheless, their inclination to expand the gamut of their attacks to the seas creates panic among security agencies which are essentially geared toward security of the land.

They also target water infrastructure, such as dams and reservoirs. Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh had specialised in capturing dams over Euphrates as a war strategy. With its virtual elimination from the Middle East, it was believed that this threat was over. But gradually other groups learnt from its experience to attack and capture dams everywhere, at times poisoning water courses to force downstream populations to surrender and pay ransom.

With the resilience of terrorist groups fuelled by Jihadi ideology and the utility of some of them for fighting low cost wars, in the process giving them a longer life line, people in many parts of Europe, the United States, Asia, Africa and Latin America believe that terrorism is a greater threat than unemployment and inequity. In the 2020s, they elect ultra nationalist illiberal leaders. Apparently, the electorates correct mistakes of the previous half decade. Political leaders who are nationalist but clearly have no ability to govern are rejected. But the nationalist ideology is there to stay. It is not in full control of state structures like Europe of the 1930s. But is has adequate popular support to influence priorities of even the liberal and democratic parties.

In its obsession with insecurity, countries of the world neglect opportunities that could be accrued from mobility of the factors of production – goods, labour, capital, entrepreneurship. This is the impact of the hookah – distorting reality, creating illusion. The fixation with fear rather than future creates a vicious cycle of intolerance, greater importance to security over economy, reduced opportunities to earn income and respect, hatred of the other, support to terrorist and extremist political groups, leading to greater violence and intolerance.

In the second half of the 2020s, it is evident that the co-existence of ultra-nationalism with democratic forces and of terrorist groups with the states using and condemning them at the same time is not tenable. Either the world will collapse into an abyss of violence and hatred from where there will be no return or it will have to reorient its principles of politics. The fragility of current imbalance is increasingly evident every day as the world enters the 2030s.



Delegates Dining Room

At the beginning of the 2020s, competition between two camps, one led by Saudi Arabia with Israeli and American support and the other led by Iran with Turkish and Russian, besides subtle Chinese support, devours much of Africa and Asia. Pakistan plays between the two camps and obtains effective immunity for its violent political forces and nuclear weapons, allowing groups like Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) and Jaish-i-Mohammed to prepare for taking over large parts of the world with their massive cadres and access to weapons of mass destruction. In the Delegates Dining Room on the fourth floor of the United Nations building in New York, the Middle East is the talk over soup, main course and dessert.

Sensing a victory for the Jihadist forces in a vacuum created by geo-political rivalries, the competition between Al-Qaida and the successor organisations of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh intensifies. The spate of terrorist attacks in Africa, Asia and Europe increase. Finally, in July 2024, while Europe focusses on Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh and its civil servants are on summer vacation, groups affiliated with Al-Qaida launch a simultaneous attack on its key transport hubs using radiological weapons. Al-Qaida owes gratitude to Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) and Jaish-i-Mohammed for securing the deadly material with the help of lower rungs of the Pakistani forces guarding its nuclear establishment.

The Western media plays into the hands of the terrorist groups. It magnifies every attack. Unchecked and unregulated social media platforms proliferate, allowing terror groups, as well as right wing groups to step up their ability to radicalize and recruit personnel remotely. The simultaneous attack on transport hubs across Europe is proclaimed as the beginning of the Third World War, reminding people of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand on the streets of Sarajevo exactly 110 years earlier.

In the following few months, wherever elections are due in Europe and North America, ultra-nationalist forces win elections with a singular agenda of spreading hatred, fear and autarchy. In other places, liberal governments fall under panic reaction from the people to the spate of attacks, culminating in

the coordinated attack with radiological weapons. Fresh elections bring extreme right-wing parties and authoritarian leaders to power. The ghosts of Mussolini and Hitler are in charge again.

Political extremism is also the order of the day in the Middle East, Africa, Asia and Latin America. The Saudi-Israeli alliance and the Iranian-Turkish alliance compete hard to take control of states across Asia and Africa. Even countries as far as Nigeria and Indonesia do not escape this contest. The Houthis secure a final victory in Yemen and Hezbollah formally takes over the government of Lebanon in partnership with other forces. Saudi Arabia and Israel feel insecure and prepare for war.

In the second half of the 2020s, the determination of nationalist governments in Europe and North America to close their borders to outsiders from outside Europe and eventually within Europe leads to the partial disintegration of the European Union. NAFTA was consigned to the dustbin of history at the end of the previous decade in any case. In this environment, scholars proposing political solutions or dialogue with the other side are charged with treason. There is a collapse of honest discourse. The global social fabric is torn apart. But for the diplomats in the Delegates Dining Room, it is only about good and bad religion, good and bad states, and good and bad terrorists.

By 2029-2030 Al-Qaida commands supremacy on the terror map of the world. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh factions in North Africa and the Sahel region splinter and join up with other groups, often off-shoots of Al-Qaida. In the Horn of Africa, piracy and terrorism become more closely enmeshed and terror attacks begin to take place in oceans and on naval interests. In addition, abundance of natural resources, especially oil reserves, in the Sahel and Horn of Africa results in simmering ethnic, religious, socio-economic and political divisions in the countries. Terror groups move in to take advantage of the situation, linking up with local groups or co-opting local agendas as part of jihadist rhetoric.



In Southeast Asia, Al-Qaida affiliates gain a foothold by joining up with or co-opting separatist or ethnic movements in the region – including in Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Thailand. In Latin America, the participation of terror groups in drug trafficking and organized crime increases. FARC's exit leaves open a space for Al-Qaida and its African offshoots to take control of the cocaine transit routes from Latin America to North Africa. Dark sites, akin to the Silk Route, become a defacto market for terror groups, leading to better coordination and easier sale of weapons and other illegal goods.

The main groups active in Pakistan begin negotiations with the military's intelligence agency and Al-Qaida for their support to launch major attacks on India, waiting for the right moment. Multiple countries attempting to negotiate with the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) directly, in separate silos, dilute any possible reconciliation with the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), prolonging the conflict in Afghanistan endlessly. The US summarily exits Afghanistan and Iraq under the leadership of a right-wing president inaugurated in January 2029, throwing those countries into major chaos. China's involvement in Afghanistan, specifically the attempt to play interlocutor with theTehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), backfires. Incensed Pakistani and Afghan terror groups incite violence within China, thereby emboldening Uighur militants to launch a major attack in Beijing or Shanghai. China suspends plans for an economic corridor in Pakistan after an attack by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) on its personnel and installations.

Eastern Afghanistan and Western Pakistan, i.e. the relatively lawless border areas between the two countries, become a single breakaway Taliban state.

Extremist and religious political parties in Pakistan become increasingly popular. Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) is able to build its party infrastructure and contest the federal elections successfully, in alliance with other extremist groups and active unofficial support from the military. Pakistan then elects Lashkar-e-Tayyiba's (LeT) founder, Hafiz Saeed, as the head of government.

A series of coordinated attacks targeting India's political and financial systems are finally carried out by Pakistani terror groups in concert with Al-Qaida, with open support from the Pakistani military. The game of brinksmanship between the two countries is played too often. It goes off balance one day.

While the diners in the Delegates Dining Room on the fourth floor on First Avenue are obsessed with the Middle East imbroglio and concerned about Israel's existence, the UN Security Council is caught unawares by the crisis in South Asia. Before it can convene an emergency session, India and Pakistan are pushed into a full-scale war. Once the war breaks out it is certain to turn nuclear. The world as evolved in the last 12,000 years would no longer the same by the following morning. What would happen in the night is the biggest question facing humanity.

Café Central

In the beginning of the 2020s, competition between Saudi-Israeli alliance and the Iranian-Turkish alliance intensifies significantly. It enables Pakistan to play the two sides and secure immunity for its extremist groups and nuclear weapons programme. By the middle of 2020s, Pakistan has substantial number of legislators elected with the help of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) and Jaish-i-Mohammed. The competition between Al-Qaida increases the spate of terrorist attacks around the world. The popularity of the right wing political parties and authoritarian leaders grows in Europe and the Americas.

In 2024, a major plot by terrorist groups to attack several of Europe's railway stations, airports, sea ports is foiled through efficient coordination by the police and intelligence agencies and useful secret information provided by some of the MENA countries. It is eventually revealed that the terrorists were planning to use biological and radiological weapons. Humanity had just missed the biggest catastrophe since the Second World War, which could have immediately launched the Third World War.

The news shocks the world. There is a sudden realisation that life is fragile and the project of humanity evolved over 12000 years can come to an end. The warnings of British scientist Sir Martin Rees about the 21st century at risk to be the last one are recalled. Across Europe and North America, where comfortable middle class life had led to the decades of political hibernation of the liberal and democratic forces, huge marches are spontaneously organised to express solidary with humanity at large. Some people recall the "Je suis Charlie" March in Paris of a decade earlier, after the terrorist attacks on Charlie Hebdo, a cartoon magazine, as being small with one million participants as compared to the marches of 2024. Beginning with Paris, London, Brussels, Rome, New York, San Francisco, Toronto, Rio de Janeiro, Bogota, the marches spread to New Delhi, Tokyo, Bangkok, Istanbul, Lagos and Cape Town. By 2025, the marches take place in Moscow, Beijing, Shanghai, Lahore and Jerusalem. The marchers remind global public opinion of the Holocaust, genocide in Rwanda, wars of Afghanistan and Syria, and publicise the photographs of the corpses of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh and Al-Qaida men, used by states for their selfish gains.



The marchers also establish voluntary dialogue groups to promote discussions between communities, particularly in urban ghettos and rural areas.

There are right wing governments in power in some countries. But they pretend to be something else in view of the public pressure, much like the turnaround by some of the Serbian leaders in the early part of the century after supporting the siege of Sarajevo to boost their political career. People realise that the right-wing ideology is no ideology at all. It is merely an instrument of discourse to spread fear and win power. If masses support a society based on reconciliation, the right-wing leaders are happy to change their rhetoric and become humanist to continue in power.

The marches and dialogue centres eventually bring leading scientists, authors and poets to the centre stage of transformation. Much like the Russell-Einstein Manifesto, leaders from different walks of life begin to draft a new manifesto of humanity which is aimed at tackling the deficit of dignity. These leaders and the huge sections of population that follow them are not interested in contesting elections. Their priority is to restrain the abuse of authority by creating a new concept of active, inclusive and conscientious citizenship. Their emphasis is on building a new moral compass.

It is 2027. The spread of different versions of the manifesto has one common element: demand for a new Congress of Vienna. The advocates of the new humanist movement note that since 2024, there has been no major terrorist attack. The massive demonstration of the forces of peace has scared the terrorists, their supporters and preachers.

Those who call for the new Congress of Vienna make it clear that the expected outcome should not be a new Concert of Powers. Rather it should be a community of states which is accountable to the community of citizens around the world. They call for the great powers to bring pressure on all countries involved in protracted conflicts to establish Talks for Talks and urge the big powers to link the access to trade, technology and investments to the peaceful resolution of outstanding conflicts by countries around the world. Saudi Arabia, Iran, Israel, Turkey see the writing on the wall and convene a Middle East Peace Conference under the auspices of the United Nations to settle their rivalries and grant viable statehood to the Palestine people with East Jerusalem as an international city under the UN protection, accessible to the Israeli and Palestinian people for worship and civic administration. India and Pakistan convene their own peace conference and establish a committee for the resolution of all disputes including the permanent status of Jammu & Kashmir. Pakistan undertakes to restrain all violent groups on its territory not only from launching physical attacks, but also from indulging in propaganda warfare.

In the early 2030s, the Congress of Vienna is finally convened. Surprisingly it has feeble security cover, though strong intelligence surveillance. There is no need for a show of strength. The terrorists have lost their ideological battle due to a combination of inter-state cooperation and the resolve of common citizens to restore the dignity of and dialogue with the marginalised people everywhere.

While the Congress of Vienna is in progress, scientists, authors and poets convene their own meetings at the historic Café Central on Herrengasse. In one of the meetings, a young poet pays tribute to William Faulkner at the stroke of midnight and says: “I decline to accept the end of man. It is easy enough to say that man is immortal simply because he will endure. I believe that humanity will not merely endure: it will prevail. We must send a message to the Congress of Vienna, a message loud and clear. We do not want the Congress to create another power structure. We want it to create another world where partnerships replace property, communities replace countries, solidarity replaces soldiers, collaboration replaces competition, sensitivity replaces secrecy, responsibility replaces recklessness, trust replaces terrorism and humanity replaces horrors.”

Annexure

Roundtable Report

MEETING ON DECONSTRUCTING TERROR

16-17 February 2018

Pune, India

Co-hosted by Strategic Foresight Group
and
Centre for the Resolution of Intractable Conflicts at Harris Manchester College, Oxford University

An international meeting on Deconstructing Terror was held in Pune, India on 16-17 February, 2018. The meeting was co-hosted by Strategic Foresight Group and Centre for the Resolution of Intractable Conflicts (CRIC) at Harris Manchester College, Oxford University and attended by 20 international experts.

The meeting followed discussion on the subject at a session on different perspectives on terrorism at the Annual Conference of CRIC held in Oxford in September 2017.

The meeting discussed conventional, as well as new ideas to understand terrorism and to deal with it. Some of the observations which throw new light on the subject are summarized below:

Concept of Terrorism

The UN Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004) defines terrorism as criminal acts intended to cause death or serious injuries or to intimidate population, governments or international organisations, with political, philosophical, ideological or religious motives. The Resolution declares all such acts to be not justifiable and recommends punitive measures.

The said Resolution derives from several earlier resolutions defining acts of terror. As these acts are of criminal nature, it was easy to seek consensus by member states of the UN Security Council to reject them.

The States have a tendency to agree on understanding of terrorism in criminal terms and to reject it. This is because terrorist groups primarily target states or the system of states as they consider themselves weak in a system made of state entities.

While the terrorist groups target States, they actually inflict damage on populations. Therefore, there is a triangular relationship between the attacker, the object and the victim. This makes it difficult to deal with terrorism. Such a triangular relationship makes response complex.

Thus, while “acts of terror” are defined legally by the UN Security Council and also a report adopted by the UN General Assembly, the phenomenon of terror eludes definition due to political connotations.

The UNSC definition leads to sanctions. However, many scholars are sceptical of this approach, as the groups listed for sanctions cannot be delisted easily if they want to change their behaviour. Moreover, as the decisions in the UN are taken primarily from the statist point of view, the perspectives of the groups who oppose the states are not considered. This may include genuine grievances.

Drivers of Terrorism

In order to deal with terrorism or political violence it is first essential to understand it. At the ground level, a combination of three factors drives people to indulge in ideologically driven political violence.

- Sense of unfairness on behalf of the community
- Feeling of humiliation on behalf of the community
- Closure of political channels for addressing perceived injustice

It is important that ALL of the three conditions must exist and that the emotions are felt by the potential perpetrators in acts of terror and political violence on behalf of a larger community and not merely on behalf of the self. Underlying this phenomenon is often a disturbed relationship between communities or countries over generations. So long as people who feel aggrieved understand the complexity of the situation, they can address the issues through dialogue and reconciliation. However, once they cross the mental boundaries of the present and past or local and global, they perceive historical developments, as well as events taking place in distant space in terms of a singular and simplistic understanding of injustice. This can propel them to follow a path of violence.

At a level above the ground, geo-political developments, military interventions, and political agendas of vested interest can generate, accelerate or trigger breakdown of complexity and collapse into singularity leading to political violence, including terrorism.

Changing Patterns of Terrorism

Since terrorism can occur due to deep rooted disturbances within and between communities, as well as various political and geo-political actions, its nature can change. Only ten years ago, terrorist groups around the world had multiple agendas, including jihadist, right wing, Christian beliefs, Maoist beliefs, ethnic aspirations, and anarchic thinking. In addition, once terrorist groups were formed, several elements joined them for pecuniary benefits through drug trade, extortion, and other criminal activities. This dimension of business of terror did not create terrorism, but added to the motives of some of the groups.

In the last 10 years, jihadi groups have survived and expanded in strength, whereas other groups pursuing tangible objectives such as share in the state power have either accepted political solutions or they have been eliminated.

The jihadi philosophy has a long history going back to the late 18th Century, in an area that is today in the border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan. It was here that in the 1980s, new jihadi groups were born with active help from state actors. Eventually the phenomena of terrorism inspired by jihadi philosophy extended to eastern districts of Pakistan to Afghanistan and further onto the Middle East. For some years, Al-Qaida was at the core of this network. For the last two years, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/ Daesh appeared as the most lethal force. However, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh is now on the wane. In the long run, the Al-Qaida network, including its partners such as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT)

and Jaish-i-Mohammed in Pakistan and Al-Qaida branches in the Maghreb region in North Africa, Arabian Peninsula, and elsewhere may prove to be resilient.

Terrorist groups essentially reject the concept of states, except a global political entity in the jihadist vision. In this form, they are able to inflict damage on states and societies. However, once they try to imitate the state structure, it is easy for the modern states to defeat them. The modern jihadist groups therefore do no concentrate in one geography, but spread across regions and countries.

Global Threat

As the growth of terrorism occurs from the collapse of complexity and the rejection of the system of states, terrorist groups in their own vision are not confined to geographical locations. Though, for political and practical reasons, they may have a specific target in a specific time frame. In the long run, they are interconnected phenomena, operating through the movement of personnel, funds, training and most significantly, ideology.

Role of States

While the system of states and essentially anti-statist terrorist groups are apparently opposed to each other, it is known that some states use terrorist groups as instruments of political objectives.

As the cost of formal warfare has increased substantially since the Second World War, particularly for states possessing nuclear weapons, the resort to proxy wars using terrorist groups has become more frequent. While some participants cited their observations of the use of terrorist groups by the state of Pakistan in its neighbourhood, others suggested that even great powers have been using terrorist groups as tactical weapons in the Middle East.

While the use of terrorism by states is known, it is not openly discussed for political reasons. A future discourse on international terrorism will benefit by bold and honest dialogue on the role of state actors in spreading terror. This may also help find solutions to at least part of the problem.

If a state uses terrorist groups for its geo-political objectives, the consequences are not limited to its intended target areas. As the terrorist groups gain strength from state support, they are able to use their man power and resources to spread their power to different parts of the world and to seek an edge over other terrorist groups.

Conclusion

The purpose of the meeting was to understand the phenomenon of terrorism and the implications for the future. Some of the tactics that terrorist groups might use in future, such as the use of cyber-technology and the use of weapons of mass destruction have potential to cause much larger damage than what has been witnessed so far. In particular, there is a risk of terrorist groups seizing control of dams and other water infrastructure, which can be damaging for large populations. But it would be short-sighted merely to concentrate on the tactics of terrorists. It is important to understand the psychology of terrorists and the role of state actors in manipulating it, if we have to find sustaining solutions.

Note: This report is a reflection of the perspectives derived by Strategic Foresight Group as co-convenor of the meeting. It is not a consensus statement and does not reflect all the discussions that took place in the meeting. As the meeting was conducted under Chatham House rules, views of individual participants cannot be made public.

List of Participants

1. The Rt Hon Lord Alderdice, Director of Centre for the Resolution of Intractable Conflicts at Oxford University (London)/ Co-Chair of the Meeting
2. Dr Sundeep Waslekar, President, Strategic Foresight Group (Mumbai)/ Co-Chair of the Meeting
3. Professor Danilo Turk, former President of Slovenia, Chairman of the Global High Level Panel on Water and Peace (Ljubljana)
4. Dr Mustafa Ceric, Grand Mufti Emeritus of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Sarajevo)
5. Dr Assia Bensalah Alaoui, Ambassador at Large of HM the King of Morocco (Rabat)
6. Dr Musa Shteiwi, Director, The Center for Strategic Studies (CSS) (Amman)
7. Mr Saban Dişli, MP and former Deputy Chair of AK Party (Ankara)
8. Dr Hans-Joachim Giessmann, Executive Director, Berghof Foundation (Berlin)
9. Dr Nasharudin Mat Isa, Executive Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Global Movement of Moderates Foundation (Kuala Lumpur)
10. Mr Jean-Louis Tiernan, Director General for Academic Partnerships, Canadian Security Intelligence Service (Ottawa)
11. Mr Jeppe Olsen, Former Senior Advisor to the National Police Commissioner of Denmark (Copenhagen)
12. Mr Cyrille Bret, Author (Paris)
13. Mr Niccolò Rinaldi, European Parliament Head of Unit, Asia, Australia and New Zealand Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union (Brussels)
14. Mr Sanjar Sohail, Founder and Editor of Hasht-e-Subh newspaper (Kabul)
15. Dr Marc Hecker, Directorof Publications, Institutfrançaisdesrelations internationales (Paris)
16. Dr Harvey Whitehouse, Director of the Institute of Cognitive and Evolutionary Anthropology, Professorial Fellow of Magdalen College at the University of Oxford (Oxford)
17. Air Marshal Bhushan Gokhale, former Vice Chief of Air Staff, Indian Air Force (Pune)
18. Lt Gen Dr Dattatraya Shekatkar, President of Forum for Integrated National Security and former Director General of Perspective Planning at the Indian Army Headquarters (Pune)
19. Lt Gen Ghanshyam Katoch, Founding Director of the Centre for Anti-Terrorism Studies and former Director General of Perspective Planning at the Indian Army Headquarters (New Delhi)
20. Ms Ilmas Futehally, Executive Director of Strategic Foresight Group (Mumbai)

Workshop Coordinators

- Dr Sachin Itkar
- Ms Parita Kotak

SFG Team

- Mr Shrikant Menjoge
- Ms Anumita Raj
- Ms Janaina Tewaney Mencomo Lala
- Mr Yash Kadam

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